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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The UK Government supports the delivery of security and justice as a basic service. An important part of that 
focuses on the building of local capacity to engage in reform of the security and justice sector as well as the 
delivery of security and justice at the local level.  
 
The purpose of this mapping study is to provide the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with a 
quantitative and qualitative snapshot of security and justice civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks 
working in and across the countries investigated.  
 
This study was conducted in two phases. The first phase culminated in the generation of an online database of 
security and justice CSOs and networks and an interim report which provided an overview of the dataset. The 
database and report should be considered as supplementary information to this report. The findings of phase two 
are presented in this report. 
 
The countries included in this mapping study present a range of different socio-political contexts with a unique set 
of circumstances for security and justice organisations in each country. Therefore, the programming 
recommendations made throughout this report, both at national or sub-regional levels, should be considered on 
their own merit. At the same time, however, there are some commonalities in the recommendations. 
 
CSO engagement on issues of security and justice is inherently difficult in many countries due to the nature of their 
governing regimes (such as where the state has authoritarian tendencies or where military regimes preside). In 
some cases the political space for CSOs to engage in issues of security and justice is being increasingly suppressed. 
Consequently, the success of donor support for security and justice CSOs often depends to a great extent on the 
political will of respective governments to enable CSOs to work freely. Furthermore, donors who wish to support 
security and justice CSOs need to take account of the extent to which donor interactions with government security 
and justice structures may influence the extent and quality of donor interaction with CSOs.  
 
In many countries, an understanding of security and justice as conceptualised and defined by donors is lacking 
amongst civil society – and an understanding of these issues as conceptualised by civil society is often lacking 
among donors and governments. This scenario even holds true in those countries where civil society as a whole is 
otherwise vibrant. Consequently, there is a need to increase the basic level of understanding on security and 
justice matters (both within CSOs and governments), to broaden the strategic community (those working in think 
tanks or engaged in policy analysis), and to support the development of research capacity and expertise in security 
and justice areas. 
 
Joined up approaches to security and justice work are rare in almost all contexts and 
common/collaborative/networking fora do not exist. Recommendations were made in almost all sub-regions 
stating that donor approaches should encourage collaboration at the outset between security and justice CSOs and 
devise schemes that reward or encourage joined up working. 
 
Without playing down the findings of this study, it is clear that more detailed assessments of needs, approaches 
and programming options at national and sub-regional levels are required. Such assessments could be led by 
security and justice CSOs and could provide a constructive and practical basis for collaboration amongst CSOs in all 
of the countries studied here.  
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 Background 
The UK Government supports the delivery of security and justice as a basic service. An important part of that 
focuses on the building of local capacity to engage in reform of the security and justice sector, as well as the 
delivery of security and justice at the local level. In order to deliver this, the Security and Justice team in the 
Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) Department at DFID seeks a better understanding of existing Southern 
civil society organisations and networks working within the security and/or justice arenas in order to define an 
appropriate approach for possible support. 
 
2.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to identify: (1) the Southern CSOs and networks that are working in the 
field of security and/or justice; and (2) the opportunities and challenges in supporting them to deliver 
improvements in security and justice. Specifically, this study seeks to: 
 Build a broad picture of CSOs and networks working on issues of security and justice in the South and how 
they are evolving; 
 Assess the extent of links and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across 
the security and justice fields; 
 Gather ideas from the South on how security and justice organisations can best coordinate to deliver 
improvements in security and justice; 
 Map existing expertise by theme, geographical area and type of activity; 
 Identify gaps between security and justice provision/demand for security and justice and the 
focus/presence of existing CSOs and networks; 
 Identify the opportunities and challenges facing existing organisations and networks. 
 
This study focused on coverage of CSOs and networks with a presence in DFID priority countries and excluded 
those which have little or no presence in DFID priority countries. However, attempts were made to include 
organisations and networks not located in priority countries but which have a significant regional role and have, or 
are already on a trajectory to gain, a footprint in priority countries. The countries included in this study are: 
 Central Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda; 
 East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; 
 Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Sudan; 
 Southern Africa: Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
 West Africa: Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; 
 South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan; 
 Middle East: Yemen; 
 Southeast Asia: Cambodia and Vietnam. 
 
2.3 Phase one 
This study was conducted in two phases. The first phase set out to produce a broad picture of the presence of key 
CSOs and networks by theme, geographical area and type of activity rather than an exhaustively comprehensive 
one. The intention was to add to existing knowledge by producing a record of key CSOs and networks, their 
expertise, linkages and current programmes and projects.   
 
The first phase culminated in the production of an online database containing details of 349 CSOs and 73 
networks, and an interim report which provided an initial overview of the data recorded. The interim report and 
online database should be considered as supplementary information to this final report. Guidelines for accessing 
the online database have been included as an appendix. 
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2.4 The focus of phase two and this report 
The results of phase one were reviewed by DFID representatives based in London and in several country offices. It 
was subsequently decided that the second phase of research should build on the initial findings and generate 
analysis on the following in each country:  
 A brief overview of the security and justice issues by country as an indication of the demand side for 
security and justice activities; 
 An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector in each country; 
 An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and 
across the security and justice fields; 
 Suggestions on how security and justice organisations can best coordinate to deliver improvements in 
security and justice; 
 Identification of the opportunities and challenges facing existing organisations and networks (e.g. funding, 
political support, capacity) and their future trajectory; 
 An indication of the major CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly; 
 Programme suggestions as to how best support Southern capacity, based on an understanding of the 
strengths/weaknesses of CSOs/networks in the context of their geographic area and operating 
environment (political and other constraints, and security and justice needs). 
 
This report presents an analysis of the research findings in each country. The final section summarises the 
recommendations offered by researchers and steering group members.  
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3. DEFINITIONS  
 
3.1 Defining security and justice 
The terms “security” and “justice” are partially overlapping concepts, which are context-specific and understood 
differently by different stakeholders, including international donor institutions, national governments, and 
representatives of civil society. The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, agreed by 
ministers in 2005
1
, and DFID’s 2007 Explanatory Note on Security and Access to Justice for the Poor
2
 provide the 
basis of the definition of security and justice used for this study. As DFID (2007) states: 
“Security and justice are closely related and complementary concepts. They refer to values and goals 
(e.g. freedom, fairness, personal safety) as well as to the various institutions established to deliver 
them (e.g. defence forces, police, courts). An environment where the rule of law is respected and 
security bodies are under the control of civilian authorities will help people feel safe and secure and 
encourage them to claim their rights as citizens. Conversely, where there is no effective and 
accountable national security structure, violence can permeate society and injustice can prevail.” 
 
The reality in most countries is that security and justice services are delivered by a range of actors. Some are state 
agencies and services, while others are non-state or civil society organisations and networks. This study mapped 
both CSOs and networks working on security and justice related issues.  
 
For the first phase of this study, it was necessary to develop a common framework for information to be collected 
and for CSOs and networks to be classified according to their nature, sector coverage and activities. The 
classification system used drew from the OECD DAC and DFID definitions referred to above and was developed 
with input from an international expert steering group. Figure 1 below shows the typology of security and justice 
sub-sectoral issues used to classify the coverage of CSOs and networks. The diagram  provides a basic illustration of 
how these sub-sectoral issues may rest on a security and justice spectrum and the extent to which the security and 
justice interests of CSOs and networks may overlap (on paper at least, if not in reality).  
 
3.2 Distinguishing CSOs from networks 
For the purposes of this study, ‘network’ refers to a connection of two or more civil society organisations at 
regional, sub-regional or national level, working on security and justice related issues.  
 
The term ‘CSO’ denotes a range of actors, such as: non-governmental organisations, grassroots, professional, 
religious, and labour organisations and groups. Academic institutions such as universities, think tanks and those 
providing education and training are included in this group, as is the media. CSOs operate at a variety of levels 
ranging from local to international; those operating sub-regionally, regionally or internationally are distinct from 
networks, in that they are structured as a single entity rather than as a partnership of two or more organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 OECD, 2005,‘DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance’, OECD DAC: Paris 
2
 DFID, 2007,’Explanatory note on security and access to justice for the poor’, DFID: London 
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Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the typology of security and justice sector issues used in this study to classify the sector coverage and interests 
of CSOs and networks.
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4. CENTRAL AFRICA 
 
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) face very different security challenges, with primary 
concerns in Rwanda centring around long-term justice and reconciliation efforts, whilst in the DRC the provision of 
basic needs is key. However, their security situations are closely linked due to the ongoing conflict in the Eastern 
DRC, where the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) contribute to ongoing instability and 
conflict even though their political agenda is focused on Rwanda. 
 
The lack of cooperation between CSOs and the state is a feature in both countries. In Rwanda, CSOs are subject to 
tight legal constraints, and to close state supervision and surveillance. In the DRC, mutual suspicion exists between 
government agencies and CSOs, with the latter accused of being linked with political parties.  
 
4.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo 
By Janine Rauch 
 
NOTE: This country section is based on large-scale fieldwork done for the Civil Society Capacity Assessment Baseline 
Study of the DFID Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPRP) in DRC. Fieldwork was 
conducted in late 2009 and early 2010 in all provinces of DRC, and over 200 CSO representatives were interviewed.  
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) live with extreme levels of insecurity. Armed conflicts persist 
and reoccur in various parts of the country, levels of sexual violence (particularly against women and girls) are 
extremely high, and state security and justice services are incapable of serving the needs of the population. In the 
absence of reliable evidence, it is assumed that most people needing security services turn to non-state providers 
such as customary justice and police systems (in more rural parts of the country) and neighbourhood security 
systems in urban areas, while a fast-growing private security sector services the elite, businesses and the 
diplomatic community. The demand for state justice is massively higher than its capacity to deliver. Reforms of 
defence, justice and police institutions are key political issues, and are of significant interest among international 
partners, both bilateral and multilateral – notably the United Nations (UN) and the European Commission (EC).  
 
Discussions of security, defence and intelligence matters remain fairly taboo (a legacy of dictatorship) and levels of 
security and justice literacy among CSOs and the general populace are low. CSOs in the security and justice system 
operate predominantly in the human rights and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) sectors, and follow the 
availability of donor funding. Many of the CSOs (focusing on issues of human rights and SGBV) offer paralegal, 
medical and legal services to victims of violence or rights abuses, including accompaniment through the criminal 
justice process. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
A small political space does exist for work on security and justice issues – though perhaps more in respect of 
policing, prisons and justice than defence and intelligence matters. Security and justice are relatively new areas for 
CSO activity, and the only aspects which have been developed to any significant extent are human rights, SGBV 
and police reform. Government agencies in the security and justice sector do not, overall, enjoy good working 
relations with CSOs. There is a climate of mutual suspicion and hostility, beneath a veneer of politeness and 
bonhomie. CSOs are often viewed as having ‘political agendas’ or as being linked to political parties. 
 
Most CSOs in the sector are not permanent – they are dormant and operate only when they receive money for 
activities. Their main experience is in public education work, within which they operate as generalists, following 
whatever funding is available, irrespective of the subject matter. Those that rely on contributions from members of 
an ‘association’, church or community group function more regularly; albeit at a lower level because their financial 
resources are small (Church-based CSOs are, generally, the strongest organisations in civil society). External donor 
funding in the security and justice sector focuses on SGBV and human rights, with a very small number of active 
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government donors – the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Netherlands, DFID, 
USAID and the EC – and an even smaller number of NGO partners such as the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) and various foreign church groups, including Pax Christi. 
 
Transparency in decision-making and financial issues, and internal procedures that respect gender equity, 
democratic practices, or tolerance of diversity are rare. Structures and practices tend to be hierarchical and strong 
individuals (rather than collectives) often dominate. Elections of office bearers and steering committees tend to be 
biannual or triannual, and there are many CSOs and networks within which elections have been long-delayed. One 
of the key problems for good internal governance of CSOs is the legislation governing NGOs in DRC, which defines 
mandatory organisational structures and removes the possibility of creative organisational design and 
development. Because of the dire economic situation in the DRC, CSOs are often viewed as a route to job-creation 
or personal enrichment; and the terrain of CSO networking or collaboration is therefore extremely competitive. 
Stronger provincial groups (noyaux) are more likely to engage in robust self-reflection than weaker ones, as they 
are less fearful of the effects and consequences of doing so. In general, the capacity to reflect and learn is 
extremely weak. This is undoubtedly related to the fact that most of the CSOs in the Reseau Reforme Secteur 
Securitaire (RRSS) de la Societe Civile du Congo (Congolese civil society network on SSR) are dormant and do not 
have sustained financial inputs to enable them to operate as functioning organisations engaged in regular practices 
of any sort. 
 
A DFID-funded initiative to build a network of Congolese CSOs interested in police reform (from 2006-2009) 
resulted in some interesting developments, but they were not sustained by ongoing funding or institutional 
development support. It is possible that the network will be re-engaged by the DFID-funded Security Sector 
Accountability and Police Reform Programme (SSAPRP). 
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
Government coordination between security and justice agencies is extremely, and deliberately, poor. Political and 
policy-level processes require the participation of individual Ministers themselves, and often their party political 
backgrounds or statuses mean that one Minister will refuse to deal with another. There is no coordinated process 
for budgeting, including budget allocations for security and justice matters; and government funds actually 
allocated are often far less than those stated in published budgets. There is resistance from the government to 
‘security sector coordination’ and also to donor coordination: they prefer to deal bilaterally with each donor 
partner. The coordination role attempted by the United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) is made complex by the 
resistance of both the donors and of the government to its efforts. Parliament has a poor relationship with the 
executive and is often not consulted at all in the preparation of major reform or strategic plans in the security and 
justice sector.  
 
This lack of sector-wide coordination from the side of the government creates an even more difficult environment 
within which CSOs must operate, especially given the fact that competition for funding militates against CSO 
collaboration.  
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
National government-level coordination across the security and justice sector in the DRC is some way off, and is 
unlikely to be affected by donor efforts as it is so politically sensitive. The current DFID SSAPRP is intending to give 
some support for security and justice coordination within provincial governments in three pilot provinces, to 
assess what may be achieved at that level. Capacitation of CSOs to enable them to appreciate and demand sector-
wide coordination (e.g. from the perspective of victims of crime; or in respect of improving conditions of work 
across the entire sector in order to improve performance) could be used to build domestic demand for 
coordination. 
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Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
The key challenge facing viable security and justice CSOs is to find medium to long-term funding and then to 
develop appropriate organisational development strategies to enable them to support a sustained programme of 
work. This will require changing their habitual practices and their traditional patterns of conflict/competitiveness 
and financial mismanagement. Increasing donor interest in civil society participation in security and justice reforms 
opens new opportunities for CSOs to enter these previously closed domains of work, and there is enormous 
potential for them to develop capacities in research, monitoring, advocacy, public education and in partnership 
with the state security and justice system. 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
There are no strong and inclusive networks in the security and justice sector. Instead, there are a handful of 
networks with differing memberships, scope and political affiliations. This means that it is not simply a case of 
identifying one or two key networks as partners to support – instead there is a need to support a larger number of 
networks simultaneously, whilst encouraging them to collaborate and improve their relationships with each other. 
This is often best done at local and provincial level, where there are real grassroots-based organisations who are 
accustomed to working together. Depending on priorities, the following CSO networks could feasibly be supported 
by DFID and other donors: 
 Provincial human rights NGO networks; 
 Provincial ‘synergies’ of organisations working on SGBV; 
 National SSR network of CSOs (Reseau de la Reforme du Secteur Securitaire) ; 
 Network on Women, Gender and Security. 
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
The new DFID SSAPRP is likely to fund individual CSOs for activities related to accountability, but only in the three 
pilot provinces. This will create enormous pressure to fund similar work or even to organise a further roll out. One 
of the most difficult ideas to lobby for in the DRC is the idea of a ‘network’ of activists in security and justice reform 
(broadly phrased) to share experiences, document their findings and inform decision-makers.  
 
Individual organisations worth encouraging are those with a nascent specialisation in security and justice matters, 
especially those which aspire to develop policy influence from a base of local expertise (research). Examples of 
organisations that DFID and other donors could feasibly support include Securitas Congo, the Pole Institute, Justice 
Plus, CJR 1325 and the university departments which engage in the security and justice sectors. 
 
4.2 Rwanda 
By Jean-Marie Gasana 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Security and justice challenges in post-genocide Rwanda are intertwined. The main post-conflict justice challenges 
revolve around the issues of transitional justice, and in particular the trials of thousands of genocide perpetrators 
who are either in jail or are free on bail. Trials are being conducted through the traditional Gacaca system of plea 
bargaining and, in parallel, formal state judicial institutions are involved in trying the orchestrators of the genocide.  
 
The securing of Rwanda’s borders with the DRC is the primary security challenge for the state security apparatus – 
particularly against infiltration attempts by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), many of 
whom are suspected of active involvement in the 1994 anti-Tutsi genocide.  
 
The tracking, arrest and transfer of genocide perpetrators to various internal and international tribunals such as 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UN-ICTR) is one high-profile area where security and justice 
converge.  
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In addition, there are ongoing justice reforms to bring the state in line with international norms and legal 
standards as part of a wider state-building process. Another potential entry-point is the DDR process for former 
combatants and soldiers from the regular army. 
 
The security and justice CSO sector consists mainly of human rights and justice orientated CSOs and networks. The 
majority of these focus on the regular monitoring of human rights violations, awareness raising and advocacy for 
law amendments. 
 
The first phase of this study indentified four primary CSOs and only two networks – The Great Lakes Human Rights 
League (LDGL), and the Collectif des Ligues et Associations de la Defense des Driots de l’Homme (CLADHO).  The 
CSOs cover issues such as: post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, civil society inclusion/participation, 
community safety, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and governance and democratic oversight of the security 
and justice sectors. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
There is little space in Rwanda for CSOs perceived to be at odds with the 'unity and reconciliation' agenda of the 
government to operate freely. However, those that studiously accommodate the agenda do have space to 
operate. Rwanda is still battling to overcome a cyclical culture of political and civil rights violations extending back 
to 1959, when part of its Tutsi population went into exile fleeing Hutu persecution. The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s 
(RPF) military victory in 1994 imposed a tight hold over the country and its political, security, administrative and 
economic structures. Reconstruction and reconciliation were given priority to the detriment of progress on other 
vital political and civil rights such as freedom of association and expression.  
 
The CSO sector in Rwanda is generally frail and lacks both capacity and sustainability. CSOs are subject to tight 
legal operating constraints and close supervision and surveillance by the state. Recent legislation requires all CSOs 
to provide annual activity reports and financial records; in the Rwandan context, this close attention to the internal 
workings of CSOs is another indication of efforts by the state to control independent voices. 
 
Civil society does not commonly engage with the state on issues of security and justice, although some CSOs have 
been instrumental in certain specific campaigns, such as the abolition of the death penalty in 2007. CSOs are more 
likely to focus on justice and only refer to security through a human security lens – focusing on issues such as food 
security and social security. CSOs and networks do not necessarily have a problem accessing activity-related 
funding, but the funding of overheads and core staffing costs is an issue, particularly because some international 
donors refuse to pay staff salaries. 
 
Assessment of the linkages and coordination between organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
In general, the state prevents the formation of security and justice CSO coalitions and networks which it perceives 
as a threat. A prominent example is the Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l'Homme 
(LIPRODHOR) which is currently at odds with the state security apparatus. 
 
At sub-regional level, the Great Lakes Human Rights League (LDGL), which operates out of Kigali, has achieved 
unparalleled stability and standing and has acquired credibility with the Burundi, DRC and Rwandan governments. 
It would appear that its regional focus allows it to operate more freely.  
 
There is a level of competitiveness amongst CSOs since funding opportunities are scarce and the interests of most 
of the CSOs assessed involve the same narrow set of issues (i.e. human rights monitoring and awareness-raising). 
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in security and justice? 
There are no opportunities for substantial co-ordination; before this can happen, the political environment needs 
to become more conducive for CSOs to engage in issues of security and justice. Furthermore, security and justice 
CSOs need to build capacity and sustainability and be seen as credible partners by the state. The challenge is to 
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persuade the state to comply with its international obligations – but civil society at the moment is not capable of 
providing the necessary pressure from within. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
The main challenges arise from anti-CSO rhetoric adopted by the government in the lead-up to the forthcoming 
August 2010 elections and the lack of funding available for meeting overheads and core staffing costs. Some pro-
government CSOs have actually hardened their positions against other more independent CSOs who are perceived 
to be heavily influenced by international donors. The elections have precipitated a further clamping down of 
independent CSO voices. For example, all CSOs wanting to be involved in elections observation are obliged to be 
part of National Electoral Commission (NEC)-run CSO forum. Some independent CSOs, such as LIPRODHOR, have 
been prevented from being part of the forum and therefore from observing the election process.  
 
The lack of funding for core staffing costs poses a threat to the medium-term existence of many of the CSOs 
interviewed. These CSOs feel that the combination of funding difficulties and government crackdowns is 
threatening to compromise existing or emerging CSO credibility. 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly  
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly support three human rights leagues: The Great 
Lakes Human Rights League (LDGL), LIPRODHOR, and the Collectif des Ligues et Associaitions de la Defence des 
Droits de l’Homme (CLADHO) are the most credible and experienced. The Institute for Research and Dialogue  for 
Peace (IRDP) and the Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) are two promising think tanks which, though closely 
related to the government, are progressively working towards autonomy of function. 
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
The success of any programming depends upon:  
 An assessment by DFID as to whether engaging on security and justice issues in its interactions with CSOs will 
meet current policy objectives and obligations; 
 Whether CSOs supported by DFID are able to apply pressure on state actors without fear of reprisals.  
 
DFID could consider supporting the development and recruitment of Rwandan experts and researchers on security 
and justice-related issues by providing funding for local research. Direct institutional support could also be 
provided to LDGL, who have been engaged in security monitoring during the recent military joint operations in the 
Kivu provinces (DRC). 
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5. EAST AFRICA 
By Jan Kamenju 
 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have enjoyed a long history of cooperation, having been British colonies until the 
early 1960s, when they became independent. In June 1963, the three countries signed a declaration of intent to 
improve trade, communications, and economic development. The intent developed into the Treaty for 
Establishment of the East African Community (EAC), which was signed on 30th November 1999. 
 
Despite their different political ideologies and economic policies at independence, the three countries have much 
in common, especially in culture, language and history. It is from this background that civil society has coalesced 
and asserted itself to transform the livelihood of communities. The East African Bar Associations, the Amani Forum 
and the East African Network on Small Arms are examples of sub-regional cooperation that could be nurtured to 
improve security and justice in East Africa. There is fertile ground to develop a security and justice community to 
steer debate, input into policy formulation and eventual implementation. 
 
5.1 Kenya 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Current security and justice perspectives in Kenya are inextricably linked with the post-election violence of 2007 – 
and especially with the implementation of the Accord, which ended the violence and set the stage for various 
reforms. Efforts to punish the instigators of violence through local investigations and prosecutions have flopped 
and have become secondary to the International Criminal Court. The embattled Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission is expected to provide a long-term solution to past injustices that were the root causes of violence, 
but this will be difficult without some capability to enforce recommendations.  
 
Because of the perceived non-partisanship of the armed forces and the powerful intelligence services, there is no 
push whatsoever for reforms within these institutions, and the SSR debate is almost entirely confined to the police. 
Twenty-nine ministries were involved in the Governance, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) Programme – although the 
majority of funds were directed towards the judiciary, with little discernable impact. 
 
The forthcoming draft constitution includes contentious issues related to security and justice, such as control over 
land holdings and the inclusion of Kadhis (Islamic) courts. These have created divisions between the 
President/Prime Minister, mainstream churches, some members of the cabinet and a divided Parliament, with 
occasional violence occurring. Those opposed to the draft want these contentious issues resolved before the 
referendum, whilst the government would prefer to deal with these after the referendum. CSOs are actively 
engaged in the debate and in public education activities around the content of the draft constitution.    
 
Other current issues in the security and justice debate include the engagement of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) later this year. The ICC Chief Prosecutor has sworn to make Kenya’s post-election violence an example to the 
world in dealing with crimes against humanity by prosecuting the planners, funders and organisers. This may 
include scrutiny of senior members of the current government. The start of free movement for East African citizens 
in the East Africa region in July 2010 is likely to complicate cross-border security, especially in relation to 
contraband trade, human trafficking and illicit small arms movement.  
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
There is no clearly defined CSO security and justice sector, but a multitude of CSOs work on specific security and 
justice issues. There are very strong human rights and gender lobbies and a weaker conflict and peace lobby. 
Despite large numbers and willingness to form coalitions, there is extremely limited technical capacity amongst 
these lobbies, virtually no crossover between them, and no obvious docking point with government priorities.  
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CSOs are accountable to their own members, management boards and donors. Those CSOs that are registered 
through the NGO Act must submit their annual audited reports, while Trusteeships and Foundations do not have 
to. Donors are the main drivers of accountability, transparency and financial management. In this regard different 
donors, who exhibit different stringency measures, set the required standards and levels of achievement and 
measure outcomes from that baseline. Donors also scrutinise expenditure and confirm adherence from annual 
audited accounts. 
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
In Kenya, security and justice are seen as two distinct and unrelated fields, and there is little overlap between 
them. In fact, security and justice are not perceived as clearly defined sectors in their own right and most CSOs and 
networks tend to be more specific in their areas of operation. In Kenya, CSOs work on specific aspects of security 
and justice, mainly: access to justice; gender; judicial reform; legal aid for the poor; and violence against women. 
Organisations are largely compartmentalised into their specific themes and there is little in the way of linkages and 
coordination between them. Overall, there are more organisations involved in what are usually classified as 
justice-related issues, and even those organisations recognised in the first phase of research as being primarily 
involved in justice tend to approach these issues from a human rights and peacebuilding perspective. 
 
Linkages and coordination amongst CSOs and networks in security and justice is very weak. Collaboration only 
occurs in some less politicised and thematic areas such as human rights, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, 
and to some extent, access to justice. This is largely because there are many such CSOs and networks that work on 
these issues specifically and form a large part of the implementation of the Accord. These are less organised in the 
planning and execution of specific security and justice activities. This underlines the need for avenues which will 
allow for open discussion and planning on security and justice issues.  
 
Donor funding has undermined coherence among CSOs and networks. Certain CSOs have been able to access 
funds because of exposure to the donor community and the extent to which their interests conform to donor 
priorities and expectations. This has resulted in increased competition at the expense of collaboration. 
 
Therefore, activities are piecemeal and incoherent. Whilst there is an appetite to deal with security and justice 
issues, there is no overarching platform to bring disparate voices together. However, there is significant security 
and justice expertise amongst CSOs/networks in Kenya and the potential to form a strong and active security and 
justice constituency. 
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
CSOs, governments and donors may find it helpful to collaborate and to investigate the best approaches to security 
and justice reform by defining the priority thematic areas, activities and programmes. In Kenya, there is robust 
capacity amongst security and justice CSOs; what is lacking is clear direction and coordination. This mapping 
exercise may have provided an initial indication of the nature of the security and justice CSO sector in Kenya and 
its priority issues – but a logical next-step could be for the primary actors identified here (supported by donors) to 
conduct a collaborative security and justice needs assessment against defined/thematic issues to produce detailed 
programming suggestions. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Funding is both an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity because of the presence of accessible and 
well-informed donor representatives in Kenya. It is a challenge because many CSOs which may have the requisite 
expertise cannot access funding due to lack of opportunities as mentioned above. The government does not fund 
CSOs and at times appears to be in competition for funding with them. However, the government does sometimes 
utilise the expertise of CSOs who are considered to be less critical of state security and justice provision. There are 
examples where the government has drawn on CSO research findings in the development of policy documents. 
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The government is not hostile towards CSOs as long as they are working in areas of mutual interest. However, 
opportunities are, by and large, very few and CSOs have to provide evidence how their work may contribute to 
improving the government’s performance or image. Political support for CSOs in this sector is lukewarm and the 
onus is largely on CSOs to demonstrate to the government their added value. It is clear that CSOs may 
independently produce results that the government can benefit from, but such opportunities only arise if CSOs and 
networks make the necessary connections.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with most of the CSOs and networks classified 
in phase one as primary CSOs and networks. These include: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC, 
Kenya); Africa Peace Forum (APFO, Kenya); and the East Africa Law Society (Tanzania) comprising six national Bar 
Associations of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Kigali, and Burundi. 
 
The following networks may also make suitable candidates for support: Eastern Africa Action Network on Small 
Arms (EAANSA, Uganda); Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) which hosts the Institute Global Partnership for the 
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC East and Central Africa, Kenya); Peace Tree Network (PTN, Kenya); Kenya 
Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA); Kenya Pastoralist Journalist Network; and the Peace and Development 
Network Trust (PeaceNet, Kenya).  
 
5.2 Tanzania 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Security and justice issues in Tanzania are shaped by the country’s political framework – a unitary presidential 
democratic republic with a President who is both Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Tanzania Peoples’ 
Defence Force (TPDF). Tanzania was created in 1964, six months after the merging of the United Republic of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26 April 1964. From independence, Tanzania remained a one party state modelled on 
socialist principles until 1995, when a change of legislation brought about multiparty elections. The Chama Cha 
Mapiduzi (CCM – Party of the Revolution) emerged victorious with an overwhelming majority. The CCM remains 
politically dominant and controls the security and justice apparatus of the country. 
 
There are many CSOs and networks in Tanzania but their room for manoeuvre is limited. For example, at a recent 
sub-regional meeting of CSOs supporting the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the National Focal Point 
Coordinator ruled out the engagement of civil society at the national level. This is despite the government being a 
signatory to the Nairobi Declaration which calls for the involvement of civil society. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
Arguably, Tanzania is the most peaceful country in East Africa and conflicts are less visible than elsewhere in the 
region. There are few CSOs that deal directly with security and justice issues – only six primary CSOs and no 
networks were identified in the first phase of research. The characteristics amongst security and justice CSOs in 
Tanzania are analogous to those in other East African countries; the CSO sector is fragile and the majority of 
relevant CSOs tend to focus on human rights and access to justice – there are no CSOs dealing with legislation and 
legislative review per se. The perception of peace means that there is little drive for security and justice reforms.  
 
The government, though not supportive, does not interfere with CSOs and there is adequate political space. 
However, the capacity of CSOs to deal with security and justice issues is rather weak and may need support from 
elsewhere in the sub-region. CSOs are accountable to their own organisations and management boards through 
annual reports and audits. However the biggest drivers for accountability, transparency and financial management 
are donors. 
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An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across 
the security and justice fields 
Linkages and coordination amongst CSOs in security and justice is weak and clustered in thematic areas such as 
human rights and access to justice. The organisations that do work on security and justice issues do so from human 
rights and access to justice perspectives. 
 
Donors could feasibly initiate a more inclusive security and justice debate amongst CSOs by directing efforts 
towards facilitating a national platform furthering the engagement and collaboration of CSOs on issues of security 
and justice.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks  
Providing impetus for CSOs to engage with the government on issues of security and justice remains a significant 
challenge. CSOs are generally disengaged and it may be necessary for a lead organisation to be identified and to 
advance the process of bringing together security and justice stakeholders.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with the following organisations: Tanganyika 
Law Society; Zanzibar Law Society; The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum Amani Forum (Tanzania Chapter); Eastern 
Africa Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA, Uganda); Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI); Eastern African Sub-
regional Support Initiative (EASSI, Uganda); Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC, Kenya); and the 
Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA). 
 
5.3 Uganda 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
The security and justice debate in Uganda revolves around the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is the most 
serious threat to President Museveni’s quarter-decade rule which began in 1986. Museveni’s initial ten years of 
rule were characterised by the ‘Movement’ system of politics, which did not allow for party political activity. A 
referendum on the reintroduction of party politics was held on 28 July 2005 and Ugandans voted in favour of a 
return to multi-party politics. However, political parties have been suppressed, and Museveni easily won the last 
presidential elections in February 2006. Museveni is the Head of State and the Commander of the Armed Forces: 
he and the National Resistance Army (NRA) control all aspects of security and justice. 
 
According to the first phase of research, only three primary security and justice CSOs operate from Uganda. They 
work predominantly on access to justice, human rights, and governance and democratic oversight issues. No 
national-level security and justice networks operate in Uganda, but the East Africa Action Network on Small Arms 
(EANSA’s) secretariat is based in Kampala. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
Uganda’s political legacy means that CSOs and networks have little room to manoeuvre – and even less so on 
issues of security and justice. The lack of political opposition to the ruling class means that the CSO sector as a 
whole is restricted. Those CSOs that do touch on security and justice do so from human rights, conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding perspectives. Those working on justice tend to focus on the provision of justice to the 
underprivileged, but have little involvement in the justice policy debate.  
 
The government is pervasive and interprets any civil society debate on security and justice as interference. It is 
convinced that sufficient security sector reforms have already been undertaken and that there is no basis for CSO 
involvement in such reforms. The dispensation of justice is highly inequitable and whilst CSOs perceive justice to 
be the preserve of elites, there are few opportunities to engage in frontline activities to improve access to justice.  
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An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across 
the security and justice fields 
CSOs in Uganda focus on specific thematic issues rather than working across the entire security and justice 
spectrum. As in Kenya, security and justice are seen as separate and distinct issues and are approached by CSOs 
from different angles. There is no common cause to unify CSOs dealing with security and justice; hence there is no 
coherent voice. However, there is a strong coalescence of CSOs and networks on the justice aspects of human 
rights and governance (e.g. corruption). Therefore, future activities could conceivably include networks that are 
not primarily engaged in security and justice activities. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
The major challenge is the perception that the state has sole responsibility for security and justice provision. The 
military, which evolved from the NRA, is politicised and seeks to protect the regime. Its reform, and indeed those 
of other security agencies, will inadvertently be controlled by the government. Thus, the political space for CSOs 
and networks to participate in the formulation and implementation of security and justice policies is highly 
restricted. The trajectory of security and justice reforms in Uganda will continue to be government controlled. 
Funding for CSOs and networks in the security and justice sector is another challenge: the government does not 
fund CSOs and donors have their own thematic agendas.  
 
CSOs in Uganda do not have operational capacity in the areas of security and justice. However, a number of sub-
regional organisations (such as SRIC, NPI and others) do have technical capacity in these issues. It would therefore 
make sense to nurture collaboration between national CSOs and sub-regional organisations.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with the following CSOs and networks: Centre 
for Conflict Resolution (CECORE, Uganda); Uganda Bar Association; Eastern Africa Action Network on Small Arms 
(EAANSA, Uganda); Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC, Kenya); Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), which 
hosts the Institute Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC East and Central Africa, Kenya); 
and the Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative (EASSI, Uganda). EASSI was classified as a secondary 
network in the first phase of research but their expertise in the field of gender could add value to the regional 
security and justice debate. 
 
5.4 Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and 
justice CSO capacity in East Africa 
 
CSOs in Tanzania and Uganda have less security and justice capacity than CSOs in Kenya. However, all countries 
could benefit from a detailed needs assessment carried out by some of the primary CSO actors identified by this 
study. Therefore, across East Africa, donor efforts could be targeted towards facilitating a common platform for 
CSO collaboration on security and justice issues – both within the individual countries and across the sub-region.  
 
A sub-regional gathering of security and justice stakeholders could initiate planning for the mainstreaming of 
security and justice issues within the East African Community’s (EAC’s) peace and security strategy. This could help 
to instil some coherence amongst the sub-regional actors and to galvanise support for security and justice issues 
throughout East Africa. 
 
The sub-regional conference could be followed by national level conferences in each country to help assess the 
priority security and justice needs and to develop programmes to meet identified needs. Together, these could 
help ensure that the sub-region as a whole develops a common approach to security and justice challenges and at 
the same time respond to specific national needs.   
 
The need for such an initiative is especially critical in Uganda: the forthcoming elections in 2011 provide an entry 
point for the engagement of CSOs in security and justice, and there are urgent issues to tackle – such as prevention 
of violence during electioneering and the elections themselves. 
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6. HORN OF AFRICA 
By Medhane Tadesse 
 
The end of the civil war in Ethiopia in 1991 and the signing of peace agreements in Sudan have allowed some space 
for CSOs to operate with increased independence. However, civil society faces enormous constraints when 
working on security and justice issues including: a lack of legal and political space; donor driven agendas; a lack of 
local ownership and political will; the lack of funding for implementation; a lack of adjustment to domestic 
institutional capabilities; non-holistic ad-hoc approaches; a lack of coordination; the lack of national security 
frameworks; and the conflict between fiscal and security imperatives. Furthermore, approaches are often narrow-
minded, with security and justice predominantly viewed from the state perspective and not the broader human 
security perspective. CSOs tend to focus much more narrowly on issues of security, excluding justice and rule of 
law issues (with the exception of policing and corrections). This narrow focus is a manifestation of the larger 
problem of definition and conceptualisation. Advocates of issues such as access to justice, human rights or 
transitional justice rarely consider security issues - other than in the context of ending ‘impunity’. 
 
While similarities in the areas of security and justice are evident, Sudan and Ethiopia are not identical. Extreme 
ideology is evident in the push towards the creation of a radical Islamist security state in Sudan and the existence 
of a significant leftist political agenda in Ethiopia. Though forced to adopt pragmatist approaches, the National 
Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan still espouses an Islamist ideology, while the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) cherishes revolutionary democracy. These ideologies have been used to construct a 
pervasive security apparatus to tackle cross-border threats, protect those in power and delay the transition to 
democracy which has subsequently affected the emergence of an independent civil society. The security apparatus 
is at the very heart of political processes in both countries and suspicions are widespread that intellectuals and 
CSOs are being used to impose donor agendas.  
 
Although both governments harbour a deep mistrust towards independent CSOs, they appear to appreciate the 
potential of CSOs as credible and legitimate actors and have thus not abolished them. Both ruling parties are 
known for creating ‘uncivil societies’ (party-affiliated organisations), which effectively undermine existing CSOs, 
especially those working on security and human rights issues. 
 
One can therefore identify the contexts for security and justice CSOs in the Horn of Africa: post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Southern Sudan; transitions from military rule (Ethiopia); and contested transitions (Ethiopia and 
to some extent in Sudan). Different contexts exist ranging from the relatively conducive with the possibility to 
engage governments directly (e.g. Southern Sudan); extremely challenging (Northern Sudan); and nearly 
impossible (Ethiopia).  
 
6.1 Sudan 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Sudan faces significant challenges, including widespread insecurity, armed conflict, community based violence, the 
marginalisation of major ethnic groups, poverty, violence against women, crimes against humanity, weak and 
corrupt justice and security institutions, abusive and intrusive security institutions, and a general absence of the 
rule of law. Hence, the engagement of CSOs in all these areas is required.  
 
Northern Sudan: Historically, Northern Sudan has had a relatively strong and well-developed civil society, but the 
sector has experienced a reversal of fortunes; the coverage of security and justice in particular has suffered due to 
the increasing consolidation of Islamic CSOs. The reasons for this are primarily political: the National Congress 
Party (NCP) took swift legal and political measures to curtail the involvement of CSOs working on justice, human 
rights and security related issues. The Sudanese government subsequently came up with new institutional 
mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Affairs Council (HAC), which imposed heavy restrictions on CSOs. This is 
despite the fact that most of the CSOs are not political in nature, having emerged in the early 1990s in response to 
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drought, famine, and conflict driven large-scale displacement and destitution. 
 
Southern Sudan: Major challenges to human security in Southern Sudan include: high levels of corruption; 
nepotism and embezzlement; poverty; lack of governance institutions; community-based violence; violence 
against women; lack of access to justice; the abundance of small arms and widespread militarisation; repatriation 
and resettlement of refugees; tribal clashes over water and pastureland; and cattle rustling. Moreover, there is 
widespread apprehension and uncertainty over the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, due 
to the recent transition from war to peace, the CSO sector in Southern Sudan is relatively active when compared to 
Northern Sudan. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
Northern Sudan: It is difficult for CSOs to engage in security and justice issues in Sudan. New legal restrictions on 
CSOs were introduced in 2006; the Organisation of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, for example, requires 
CSOs to seek government approval of all proposals before they are submitted to donors. The government has also 
prohibited CSO engagement in political issues including human and civil rights and governance.  
 
The strategy of the government in Northern Sudan has been to pre-empt the functions of existing independent 
organisations, supplanting them with its own bodies. Consequently, several 'Islamic' CSOs have sprung up in 
Sudan, supported by the state and primarily funded from the Gulf.  
 
Currently, there are no major CSOs actively working on security and justice issues although a few are trying to 
engage, such as the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. In addition, International NGOs and high 
profile human rights groups fill many of the gaps in this front.
 
For example, PACT Sudan is active in this area, 
working through a number of indigenous CSOs and could provide a useful channel to advance the security and 
justice agenda. The media have a good record at highlighting individual cases of criminal injustice/unfair trial 
despite the restrictions that they are operating under. 
 
Southern Sudan: The context of an essentially militarised government and a civil society whose leadership moved 
into government means that it is difficult for CSOs to engage in this sector. However, the current environment is 
comparatively more conducive when compared to Northern Sudan, with a renewed engagement by the 
international community acting as a catalyst. With support from international partners the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) have initiated a process of defence transformation in line with an approved Defence White 
Paper. This initiative presents considerable opportunities for civil society engagement, and with UK support 
through the Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation (SSDDT) programme, is specifically focused 
on facilitating this. A forum for engagement between the security institutions and civil society has recently been 
launched. 
 
An assessment of linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the 
security and justice fields  
Northern Sudan: Rather than focusing on core security and justice themes, CSOs tend to focus much more 
narrowly on general issues of community development and reconciliation. This narrow focus is a result of the lack 
of political space, but it is also a manifestation of a bigger problem of definition and conceptualisation. There is a 
lack of knowledge, expertise and capacity among the CSOs themselves, whilst networking and coordination are 
also poor. 
 
Southern Sudan: In Southern Sudan, there are active CSOs and networks but they often adopt a disjointed 
approach to security and justice issues. There appears to be an unnecessary duplication of roles amongst those 
organisations that focus on issues of peace and reconciliation and no mainstreaming of security and justice issues. 
Furthermore, there are numerous community-based organisations (the majority of CSOs could be defined as thus) 
all of which focus on reconciliation at a grassroots level, violence against women, voluntary disarmament and the 
management of tribal clashes.  
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How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
Northern Sudan: As stated above, Sudan has recently witnessed the mushrooming of ‘NGOs’ supported by Islamic 
philanthropist agencies, which are less interested in security, justice and governance issues. The Economic Social 
and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), created by the African Union, is a potential vehicle for facilitating networking and 
convergence as many Sudanese CSOs are represented. 
 
Southern Sudan: The Saferworld initiated Southern Sudan Civil Society Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) is 
an important development. Its main focus is on disarmament and community security, and although it does not 
currently deal with justice issues, the network could serve as a major vehicle for progressing security and justice 
interests. In addition, Southern Sudan is home to long-established faith-based groups such as the numerous 
Catholic Church agencies who have a track record of proven engagement on peace and reconciliation and justice 
issues but have not seriously engaged in security issues. Other organisations focus on gender and peace, 
community security, conflict resolution and disarmament, and if provided with necessary knowledge and capacity, 
could also be potential players.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing organisations and networks 
Northern Sudan: The NCP has enacted swift legal and political measures to curtail the involvement of CSOs in 
security and justice related issues. The problem is not technical in nature - it is structural and political. A critical 
factor is the degree and nature of democratisation and the corresponding nature of the political system. This 
coupled with the role of Islamic philanthropist organisations have impacted upon the philosophy of a great deal of 
Sudanese CSOs. 
 
Southern Sudan: The problem of security and justice CSOs in Southern Sudan is not an absence of political will or 
the lack of interest; it is rather a lack of capacity and knowledge. On one hand, the early process of transition from 
war to peace results in the proliferation of national and international NGOs. However, on the other hand, the very 
same reason raises questions about the capacity (related to infancy) of security and justice CSOs. Thus, parallel to 
engaging with and supporting the capacity of governments, any serious engagement in security and justice issues 
should also focus on developing the capacity of CSOs and fill the gap in capacity at both analytical and operational 
levels. Using major INGOs such as PACT and Saferworld, or SSANSA and other networks such as the Horn of Africa 
Security Sector Network, led by the Centre for Police Research and Dialogue (CPRD) with member organisations in 
Southern Sudan, could help in achieving this. 
 
6.2 Ethiopia 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Ethiopia’s security problems arise from many factors: widespread poverty, inaccessible justice, violence against 
women, the lack of democratic control and oversight of the security sector, the politicisation of state institutions, 
resource-based ethnic (mainly pastoral) conflicts, an increasingly narrowing political space, the threat of terrorism 
and radicalisation, and spill-over effects of insecurity from neighbouring countries. CSOs have a role to play in all of 
these issues, but remain insufficiently involved in the security and justice arena. To date, security sector issues 
have not been considered a priority in the face of other competing demands which are more evidently linked to 
institutional reform and poverty reduction. Civil society involvement in reform processes, in terms of either 
debating government plans or contributing to policy development, is limited. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
Despite some genuine attempts at opening up the space for CSO activism, the legacies of militarisation and 
revolutionary war have been difficult to shake off. The political space required for civil society engagement is 
lacking. This is compounded by a new NGO law which targets security and rights-based CSOs. The law came into 
effect only in February 2010; its ramifications are yet to be documented. Consequently, governments, 
international agencies and other stakeholders do not know where to turn when they require information on the 
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current status of CSOs working in security and justice. This makes a mapping of this nature both difficult and 
important.  
 
The government views civil society with a great deal of suspicion, particularly if they are publicly critical, because 
independent CSOs that receive foreign funding are perceived to be promoting donor agendas. Much like the NCP 
in Sudan, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)-led government tends to perceive 
autonomous CSOs as a challenge to its sources of foreign funding and political control. Meanwhile, even among 
CSOs, security issues are still considered as the domain of the state. Some military issues, such as defence budgets, 
the costs and modalities of intelligence, and political and national security remain closed to public (even 
parliamentary) scrutiny. The few CSOs engaged in justice-related matters, such as the Ethiopian Women Lawyers 
Association (EWLA) and the Ethiopian Bar Association (EBA), suffer from a lack of capacity and access to 
information and are therefore unable to provide analysis or inform the public of key justice issues. 
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
CSOs are weak and lack capacity and expertise, and there has been little coordination between security and justice 
CSOs. Few cross-country activities exist: there are no national or regional CSO security and justice networks. Even 
before the promulgation of the NGO Law there were very few independent CSOs working in the area of security 
and justice. Most of those working in the justice sector, such as the Network of Ethiopian Women Associations 
(NEWA) and the Organisation for Social Justice Ethiopia (OSJE), focus on rights issues and do not cover access to 
justice in any depth. Furthermore, their only link to security issues was in their regular dealings with the police or 
prisons in relation to justice for women. The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRC) made some attempts to look 
at its role from a broader human security perspective, but its reports have only focused on human rights violations 
and associated issues of impunity.  
 
The problem stems from the lack of a broader understanding of security (lack of knowledge and capacity), which is 
in itself a manifestation of a larger problem of definitions and conceptualisations. There is a paucity of literature on 
the subject of security and its linkages with justice in the Ethiopian context, and although some security and justice 
related literature has sprung from the Ethiopian Diaspora, much of it is not available to the CSO community in 
Ethiopia. 
 
The very few national and regional CSOs dealing with security issues, such as the CPRD (mainly SSR and DDR) and 
the Ethiopian Economists Association (mainly economic development), focus on national and regional aspects 
related to security and economic research and policy development. In almost all of these cases the justice element 
is either ignored or delayed. 
 
Lastly, the dependence on foreign funding and a lack of specialisation among CSOs has undermined the formation 
of effective networks, making them competitive rather than cooperative. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing organisations 
The NGO Law is a major challenge for security and justice CSOs. Many have been forced to change their mandates, 
names, focus and scope. All have been instructed to register themselves as Ethiopian Resident CSOs and as such 
they are not allowed to secure more than ten per cent of their budget from outside of Ethiopia. As a result, many 
of them have trivialised their scope and gravitated towards less sensitive issues such as access to economic 
benefits, children’s rights, HIV/AIDS, and free legal assistance for poor women on issues related to divorce and 
inheritance. Only a couple of native Ethiopian CSOs, such as CPRD and the Initiative Africa, are still exploring 
opportunities that the newly promulgated directives might offer through negotiating with the government. 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Justice and security CSOs were vulnerable in Ethiopia, and the new law makes them almost non-existent, with 
limited possibilities for external support. Many of the major security-related CSOs that donors might have 
partnered with are not legally registered and thus their fate is as yet unclear. If they survive the storm, DFID could 
consider supporting the FSS and CPRD (security and development) as well as the EHRC, the Ethiopian Women 
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Lawyers Association (ELWA) and NEWA (justice and rights issues). Another sub-regional mechanism in support of 
security and justice is the Horn of Africa Security Sector Network (HASSN), which is currently hosted by CPRD. This 
aims to facilitate a joined-up approach to security and justice issues across the Horn of Africa sub-region. 
  
6.3 Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and 
justice CSO capacity in Ethiopia and Sudan 
 
Several points recur for Ethiopia and Sudan. The current situation in both countries (with the slight exception of 
Southern Sudan) is not conducive for security and justice CSOs, and one cannot expect any change in the near 
future. At the same time, the limited availability of entry points and information, as well as the weakness of civil 
society in both countries, may also reflect the lack of significant security system developments there. Although 
developments in South Sudan provide numerous opportunities, CSOs remain weak and an integrated approach to 
security and justice is lacking. DFID could therefore: 
 Encourage CSOs to broaden their scope from democracy and governance to take operational effectiveness of 
security and justice institutions and states seriously, bearing in mind that engagement in sensitive areas will 
be very difficult. Becoming less political and more evidence-based would help to reduce suspicion towards 
CSOs; 
 Support CSOs in a way that emphasises the potential benefits to governments, such as developing their 
capacity to effectively resolve pressing security and justice challenges. To help immunise itself against the 
state's pre-emptive and restrictive measures, civil society could adopt self-discipline, ethical codes and 
internal commitment to the values of democracy, transparency and accountability that it so often preaches; 
 Support both the capacity of governments to undertake security and justice programmes, and (particularly in 
Southern Sudan) the analytical and operational capacity of CSOs; 
 Set objectives as part of any funding arrangements to encourage collaboration amongst CSOs; 
 Consider the IGAD-CSO Partnership forum, notably the Peace and Security Cluster formed in 2008, as an 
alternative means of advancing CSOs’ security and justice agendas; 
 Rally the support of regional organisations such as the African Union, NEPAD (especially the APRM) or the AU-
sanctioned Mbeki Panel on Sudan. 
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7. SOUTHERN AFRICA 
By Gabriel Malebang 
 
The Southern African region is at present characterised by a peace dividend with an absence of interstate conflict. 
An atmosphere of stability prevails in most member countries of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Out of the DFID priority countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, Zimbabwe remains the 
only state with continued reports of political violence and the incarceration, abuse and intimidation of political 
opponents. The others – though grappling with similar problems of poverty and poor economic growth – are fairly 
stable, and have held frequent elections in the past decade which were judged free and fair by international 
observers. Some challenges faced by the security and justice sectors of countries in the region include but are not 
limited to the following: vulnerable agrarian economies; poor service provision; poverty; inequality; unequal 
distribution of land; cross-border smuggling; violent crimes in cities (burglary, hijacking etc.); human capital flight; 
low institutional capacity; poaching in game parks; cattle rustling; natural disasters such as droughts, floods and 
desertification; insecure borders; disrespect for the rule of law; defective criminal justice systems characterised by 
vigilante justice; the availability of low cost weapons; dwindling resources; and worsening climatic conditions. The 
activities of CSOs and NGOs in the region have mainly been driven by efforts to contain some of the above 
challenges.  
 
7.1 Malawi 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Malawi suffers from a major absence of human resource capacity which affects all sectors including the justice and 
security sectors. Key issues in Malawi are: illegal immigration; drug and human trafficking and illegal cross-border 
trade; slow and compromised judicial structures; processes and capacity leading to costly, delayed and denied 
justice; police brutality alongside small arms proliferation and armed crime; a disempowered citizenry; and 
inequitable access to security services. Distrust characterises civil society-state relations, and some political leaders 
still perceive CSOs as a threat to their power. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
A diagnosis of Malawi’s CSO security and justice sector reveals challenges in funding, coordination, technical 
expertise and expert knowledge. The end of authoritarian rule in Malawi means that there is political space for 
CSOs to operate, but at the same time CSOs and networks cannot recruit and retain experienced and capable 
personnel. The activities of CSOs are predominantly focused on the areas of civil society inclusion, gender, 
governance and democratic oversight, and the rule of law. Essentially, civil society in Malawi is not as vibrant as it 
could be under the relatively stable, though conservative, political environment.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields  
There are minimal linkages and coordination between CSOs working on issues of security and justice. Most CSOs 
and networks work in isolation and this has increased duplication and reduced impact. There is competition for 
prominence, and attempts to build linkages across justice and security have been slow because of dependency on 
international donor funding. 
 
Balancing justice and security has proven difficult; as the justice sector still faces significant challenges in meeting 
constitutional and democratic commitments to respect human rights and the rule of law, and as such CSOs are 
more active in justice issues. They are less inclined to associate with security matters out of fear of reprisals. This 
tends to mean that security and justice are distinct areas of operation for CSOs.  
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How can security and justice organisations best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security 
and justice? 
There is need for a thorough local assessment of security and justice CSOs to determine levels of expertise and 
capacity. It may be helpful to begin with existing structures and institutions to determine how they can be 
strengthened. The creation of a network of security and justice CSOs underpinned by a well-capacitated secretariat 
could also be explored. The government could be lobbied to commit to an annual CSO budget for coordination 
activities and to set up a unit in an appropriate Ministry to oversee how the money is spent. Government support 
for the coordination of CSO activities might show commitment to ensuring that funds reach all sections of society, 
including people in rural and remote areas. 
 
There is an overarching need for a legal policy framework and operating guidelines to guide the activities of 
Malawi’s CSOs and networks. This could also address civil society accountability and internal democratic processes. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks  
There is both the political space and a will to work on security and justice matters, and the government is willing to 
work with civil society. There is also a strong willingness to cooperate among CSOs. However, funding is the 
greatest challenge and the scarcity of resources means that CSOs do not have the means to implement whatever 
good ideas they may have. The work of CSOs in security and justice is fragmented, short term and generally 
unfocussed. A needs assessment could identify priority areas and clarify challenges and opportunities.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: The Centre for Human Rights and 
Rehabilitation, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Chancellor College, and the Centre for Security 
Studies at Mzuzu University. 
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
There is a need for community mobilisation and empowerment, research and analysis, judicial reform and the 
provision of legal aid services, and civic education. Capacity building for CSOs would be particularly beneficial in 
the areas of fundraising and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
7.2 Mozambique 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
The political situation in Mozambique is not as turbulent as it was about a decade ago but its society still 
experiences high levels of insecurity. Formal justice is dispensed through a plural legal system where the majority 
of citizens are still governed by Customary Law; citizens are thus largely unable to demand their rights from the 
state. The state has neither the requisite institutional capacities nor the political will for justice and security 
provision. For example, the design of police cells, which are not compliant with international standards, is a major 
cause of violence and abuse of rights, even if there is no intent to kill inmates. There are gaps in state security and 
justice provision in the areas of arrest and litigation, democratic and civilian control of security services and 
adherence to human rights norms. People are generally reluctant to seek recourse from the state’s justice 
machinery since the country has limited legal expertise (some laws and policies in the justice and security sector 
are contradictory and confusing) and few practitioners (defence lawyers, prosecutors and judges). Security threats 
and human rights abuses arise from: state action (torture, extra judicial killings and arbitrary arrests and 
detentions); or communities or individuals taking matters into their own hands (e.g. through vigilante killings). The 
way in which the government attempts to bridge the gaps between the different legal systems (or its failure to do 
so) is important to people’s perception of justice and fairness. CSOs require funding for activities to improve access 
to security and justice for ordinary citizens as well as to effectively monitor projects, policies and laws relating to 
citizen security. This implies that mechanisms for holding the government accountable to its people, and not just 
to donors, may be beneficial.  
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An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector  
The operational environment for CSOs in Mozambique seems largely congenial to those organisations that are 
closer to the state. Those operating further from the state and seeking to engage with the state on issues such as 
access to justice, information dissemination, and security sector accountability and reform avoid challenging the 
government for fear of reprisals. This culture of fear is due to the country’s history of political violence. Generally, 
CSOs in Mozambique are neither strong nor sufficiently organised. Some notable CSOs, though formally well 
established, lack a clear mandate and tend to act in areas where there is funding. They do little to cover their 
running costs and therefore have no culture of sustainability. It appears that justice-oriented CSOs are more active 
than those focusing on the security sector, supposedly due to the sensitive and challenging nature of engaging on 
security matters in Mozambique.    
 
An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working in the security and 
justice fields  
The coordination of CSOs that have interests/activities in similar issues is not strong. Connections between them 
have been further hampered by political interference. CSOs are mainly challenged in terms of capacity. When 
consulted by government, CSOs do not have the capacity or time to input. A great deal of capacity building and 
training is required. Coordination is largely ad hoc, informal and without clear and transparent criteria. Security 
and justice seem to operate in silos and there is little evidence of crossover. This results in unnecessary 
fragmentation and CSOs have failed to capitalise on opportunities to adopt a nationally inclusive and broad-based 
civil society strategic framework.  
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
There is a need to organise regular national debates on security and justice issues. There is also a need to improve 
information dissemination and to launch campaigns to urge the state to ratify relevant international instruments 
on security and justice. DFID and like-minded donors could assist in lobbying for the strengthening of the Ministry 
of Justice budget so that human capacity can be increased to get things moving quickly. The Ministry of Justice is 
one of the more poorly-funded departments in the State budget. 
 
The newly-created CSO Confederation (Rede de Organizacoes da Sociedade Civil, or ROSC) is expected to produce 
a comprehensive CSO database. This should lead to better coordination and participation by smaller CSOs.     
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks  
Political opposition needs to be strengthened for purposes of democratic consolidation, and this is an opportunity 
for CSOs to promote citizen participation. Challenges include: the lack of political will to address human rights 
abuses, corruption and access to justice; the lack of sufficient personnel with experience and technical skills; the 
lack of a clear and adequate national programme of action by CSOs; and inadequate organisational and leadership 
capacity within civil society. There is also an attempt by the government to regulate the operation of CSOs. Bearing 
in mind that most people are governed by Customary Law, access to justice will hopefully be addressed by the 
passing of a Bill on "Community Courts".   
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: The Mozambican League of Human 
Rights, the Defence and Security Management Project at Eduardo Mondlane University, and Women and Law in 
Southern Africa (WLSA Mozambique).  
 
Programme suggestions as to how best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
If real change is to be achieved, it may be appropriate to engage with the institutions responsible for the areas of 
concern, and to try to influence them to address the problems. A capacity building programme to help CSOs to 
meaningfully, strategically and tactically engage with the state and citizens might therefore be useful. Civic 
education, for example, could help ensure that people are aware of their rights and responsibilities as well as of 
the roles of state institutions, particularly the security and justice apparatus. There is also a need to support the 
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formation of a national Human Rights Council and a national Security Council, which would monitor and promote 
security and justice. 
 
7.3 Zambia 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Conceptions of justice in Zambia revolve around the crafting of the constitution and how the ruling party is 
directing this process, and a number of CSOs are working in these areas. The view of CSOs in Zambia is that the 
dispensation of justice is flawed, although such views may be held for opposite reasons; the prosecution of the 
former president Chiluba is a case in point. Some people took the view that he was a victim of a witch-hunt. 
However, many CSOs protested at his recent acquittal of corruption charges, claiming that the President and ruling 
party had influenced the outcome. There are few internal security threats, but several external threats such as 
fears of a spill-over of conflict from the DRC. There is also a problem of illegal immigrants entering from Rwanda, 
DRC and Zimbabwe, and of hired criminals from Angola (called “Caravinas”) killing elderly people suspected of 
practicing witchcraft. Further security and justice problems include: internal displacement due to floods; gender-
based violence (including domestic violence) and corresponding security sector responses; abuse of underage girls 
and children by men; land issues; human rights abuses; HIV/Aids; and corruption.  
 
There are four security and justice-related CSOs in Zambia. Two of these primarily work on issues of security and 
justice: the Defence and Security Management Project (based at the University of Zambia) and the Law Association 
of Zambia. Together, these organisations cover the following security and justice sector issues: access to justice; 
civil-military liaison; civil society inclusion/participation; conflict prevention and peacebuilding; corruption; defence 
reform; gender; governance and democratic oversight; judicial reform; legal aid for the poor; police reform; and 
rule of law. This represents a broad range of issues, but the small number of security and justice-related CSOs in 
Zambia means that there is no depth of coverage in any of them. 
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector  
Civil society is vibrant, though not well coordinated. Many CSOs contain experienced people, and this has enabled 
them to attract donor support over the years, but this support is often viewed with suspicion by the government. 
Most CSOs are well established but lack funding, and most of them only have a minor focus on security issues. A 
new NGO Act has been passed which, depending on how it is enforced, may prevent CSOs from championing 
donor agendas with which the government disagrees. There are also, however, some CSOs which have been 
discredited by donors due to questionable credentials. 
 
Some CSOs are owned by the individuals who founded them, and do not have internal accountability mechanisms. 
CSOs should ideally have constitutions and clauses for retirement, change of leadership provisions and be required 
to keep audited accounts. The new NGO Act is aimed at addressing these issues. 
 
An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across 
the security and justice fields 
There is poor coordination between those CSOs working on justice and security issues. CSOs to a large extent 
within the individual sectors work in isolation, and send mixed signals to the government. CSOs also tend to 
compete to attract donor support and thus undermine each other. 
 
How security and justice CSOs can best coordinate to deliver improvements in security and justice 
The CSO umbrella body in Zambia, the Non-Governmental Organisation Coordinating Council (NGOCC), is weak, 
and unable to coordinate the activities of CSOs well. CSOs need to establish collective frameworks through which 
to explore possible synergies – and a first step could be for CSOs to provide better support to NGOCC. There is 
resistance to the new NGO Act for the regulation of CSOs, but there are few self-regulatory measures in place. 
Networks such as the NGOCC could employ full-time coordinators with permanent secretariats. CSO staff also need 
additional training in areas such as monitoring and evaluation. The newly-created Zambia Governance Fund not 
only provides larger, more capable CSOs with financial aid, but also provides capacity building support for smaller 
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CSOs in areas such as strategic planning, financial management, project management, and monitoring and 
evaluation.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Opportunities exist for CSOs to fill current gaps in civic education, particularly towards increasing public 
understanding of the need to augment political processes (especially because security threats have much to do 
with politics). Zambian CSOs by and large still enjoy good will from donors, and they need to coordinate their 
activities to keep donor support flowing. The government could engage more constructively with CSOs, rather than 
seeing them simply as opponents.  While it is legitimate for CSOs to challenge the government where appropriate, 
they would probably have greater impact if they worked with the government as a partner rather than being 
perceived as constantly oppositional.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: The University of Zambia Southern 
African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) Project; the Law Association of Zambia; the Legal Resources 
Foundation; and the Child Justice Forum (which is part of the Zambia Civic Education Association).  
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
Civic education on security sector governance is a priority area for some of the CSOs identified here and is 
therefore an area that could benefit from donor support. DFID and other donors could encourage coordination 
amongst CSOs by building incentives into its grant schemes and by targeting new and emerging CSOs and 
networks. Donors could consider assessing the following competencies when making funding decisions: 
monitoring and evaluation capabilities; strategic planning; and mechanisms to ensure the effective 
implementation of programmes.  
 
7.4 Zimbabwe 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
There has not been a real debate on security sector reform in Zimbabwe, so there is still need to analyse the 
country’s security needs. Under the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was signed in October 2008, there 
should be full civilian control of security forces. However, this is not the case – as evidenced by the fact that the 
National Security Council has hardly met since the GPA. In terms of justice, the police are perceived to interpret 
the law in a flippant manner and there is evidence that the court machinery has been operating in a partisan and 
impartial fashion for nearly a decade. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2000 (amended in 2007) has 
been a major stumbling block to those who endeavour to further the justice and security agenda. Since its 
inception in 2000, the POSA has been used by the ruling party to infringe on the fundamental right to freedom of 
association and civic organisation.  
 
An assessment of the ‘general health’ of the CSO security and justice sector 
Zimbabwean civil society has produced a sizeable literature documenting the operations of security forces. They 
have also mounted over a thousand civil litigations against human rights violations. However, it is currently difficult 
for security and justice CSOs to function due to constant blocking of initiatives by the state. The introduction of 
legislation designed to regulate the non-governmental sector prevents the monitoring and documentation of 
human rights violations and excesses perpetrated by security forces. CSOs dealing with security and justice issues 
are hamstrung because at times the legislation is invoked to prohibit them from receiving foreign funding. 
  
Civil-military relations are confrontational and this has compromised parliamentary oversight of security organs. 
Overall capacity has been depleted by the political crisis and coordination is a key problem, especially in the 
security sector. Some organisations have lost their independence and relevance as a result of the nationwide 
assault on CSOs by the state.  
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CSOs in Zimbabwe have significantly more experience and knowledge of justice than of security matters. Despite 
relentless government propaganda, organisations such as the NGO Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
Human Rights and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, to mention a few examples, have 
continued to make the world aware of land reform injustices, systemic human rights abuses and civil and political 
violations.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
Security and justice are not treated in isolation of each other because of the political implosion in the country. 
There are a plethora of coalitions but it is difficult to achieve meaningful coordination because the CSOs have been 
marginalised and deconstructed by the state. This produces confusion as to where authority and mandates come 
from. There is no comprehensive strategic analysis of problems and solutions, and many organisations find 
themselves working at cross-purposes and engaging in unhealthy competition for prominence.  
 
How can security and justice organisations best coordinate to deliver improvements in security and justice? 
The first step is to create a strategic alliance between CSOs. Members could then be deployed according to their 
expertise and persuasions, while all working on a common strategy. This could be achieved by channelling support 
to CSOs according to sectors instead of projects. There is a need to create guidelines and manuals on security 
sector reform. In addition, dialogue between political parties and CSOs on themes of justice and security could be 
used as a basis to develop guidelines on a national justice and security strategy. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing organisations and networks  
Zimbabwe had a well functioning security and justice system that has been damaged by the political crisis. The GPA 
and the power sharing arrangement, however, have created new political and civic spaces through which CSOs can 
engage in a more forthright manner. The capacity for collective action is enormous, but opportunities to make an 
impact may be scarce. The risk is that Zimbabwe will have to face an election in the near future and, depending on 
the outcome, the currently available space may close. There is a lack of political will for reform by political leaders 
who are benefitting from an over-politicisation of the justice and security sectors. Further, the humanitarian, 
political and financial crisis in Zimbabwe has meant that global trends in security and justice have passed 
Zimbabwe by, and whilst some organisations have lost credibility since moving closer to the state, others have 
been completely destroyed. Many CSOs are elite technical bodies and do not represent a particular constituency of 
citizens; others do not have any inbuilt accountability processes and experience challenges of self-regulation. 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: The Centre for Defence Studies, 
University of Zimbabwe; the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme; the Zimbabwe Peace Support Programme; 
the Amani Trust (now called the Counselling Services Unit); and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. 
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
Support could be channelled towards national security planning with a focus on accountability and parliamentary 
oversight of the security sector. It might also be directed towards laying the foundations for future reform by 
carrying out baseline research or by writing think pieces where the politics permit. 
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8. WEST AFRICA 
By Eboe Hutchful 
 
It is no coincidence that the West African sub-region is both one of the poorest and the least stable regions in the 
world. Conflicts, coups, dictatorships, transnational organised crime and weak central governments have 
characterised its recent past. These concerns continue to pose a considerable challenge to national and regional 
stability as well as to human security. 
 
Security threats vary across the region: several countries including Nigeria contend with ongoing insurgencies; 
Sierra Leone is in a post-conflict phase with a pronounced international presence; whilst Ghana is working towards 
entrenching democracy, although the latter has had to face instability and violence associated with the previous 
elections as well as tribal tensions in the north-east. 
 
The situation with regard to the CSO sector can best be described as cautiously positive, and whilst some 
organisations could be deemed ‘vibrant’ and ‘technically strong’, these are probably in the minority rather than 
representative of the CSO sector as a whole. 
 
8.1 Ghana 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Ghana is seen as offering the most benign and facilitative environment in West Africa for security and justice CSOs. 
The government itself, the legislature and security agencies are seen as responsive to overtures by CSOs. In striking 
contrast to Nigeria, the security institutions are viewed as more open to collaboration with CSOs, with the judiciary 
somewhat less so.   
 
This positive picture is not without its downside, however. First, Ghana’s ‘good governance’ stamp of approval is 
marred by a number of issues including: 
 An inability to resolve the long-running conflict in the North-east; 
 Poor service delivery and lack of accountability of both public and private sector service agencies; 
 A weak and under-funded judiciary (a shortage of magistrates is a particular problem); 
 Justice sector reforms (especially those funded by the World Bank) that have so far been of a technical 
nature, designed to improve judicial infrastructure but apparently less interested in addressing problems of 
accessibility; 
 Fractured views of the security and justice sector: both the police and judiciary are perceived as corrupt, and 
public opinion surveys have placed them last in integrity and public respect; the military on the other hand is 
seen as the most respected national institution; 
 Lack of a learning curve in parliamentary oversight or defence and security management (with electoral 
turnovers leading to fitful stop and starts), and an absence of a national security policy framework; 
 Little regulation of the burgeoning private and informal security sector (the notorious ‘landguards’ in 
particular); 
 Drug scandals that during the last few years have highlighted increasing corruption among poorly paid 
security and public officials. There is concern, too (based on Nigeria’s experience), that oil exploitation may 
expose Ghana to new domestic security challenges; 
 Concern over oil security that may be moving the entire security architecture (especially the navy) from an 
international peacekeeping toward a ‘Maritime Security’ posture. (However, the naval force finds itself in 
competition with well-connected international private security providers); 
 An almost total lack of instruction in Security (or Conflict) Studies in institutions of higher learning and a 
corresponding paucity of evidence-based research in the area by universities, think tanks and CSOs (although 
the donor-funded Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP) has tried to address this in the broader 
policy arena).  
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All these factors have contributed to an appearance of complacency in addressing underlying security and justice 
challenges, a complacency which seems to be shared by the donor community. 
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
Correspondingly, Ghana’s CSO sector is seen as fairly robust (even thriving), reflecting a deepening (and 
increasingly self-confident) democratic culture. It is possible to identify CSOs (and even networks) that are vibrant, 
well-established, experienced, and technically strong, or organisations that enjoy good access to and collaborative 
relationships with formal security and justice institutions. Several CSOs seem to have a high profile in this area: for 
example, African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) runs a parliamentary oversight training programme and a 
‘Security Sector Governance and Management’ (SSGM) course on behalf of the National Security Council. 
 
However, the positive qualities ascribed to CSOs are seen as applying to only a very few CSOs. Overall, the sector is 
viewed as fragile and vulnerable to a number of pressures: it is primarily donor-funded and thus open to donor 
agendas, and lacks adequate funding across all phases of activity – for institutional development in particular. The 
sector also has difficulty in hiring and retaining competent staff, aggravated by competition from and ‘poaching’ by 
better-established and funded private and international institutions. The loss of key individuals has sometimes led 
to the collapse of major programmes.   
 
Few CSOs are actually involved in sustained security and justice work. Those that are, include: ASDR (parliamentary 
oversight, SSR, defence and broad national security issues); Women in Peace and Security Network (WIPSEN) 
(gender and SSR); Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (police accountability); Legal Resources Centre (police-
community relations, legal aid); International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) (legal work in support of 
women); the Ghana Centre for Democracy and Development (occasional public opinion surveys and other work on 
security and justice issues); the Media Foundation for West Africa (regional and human security via media), with 
the Third World Network addressing issues of resource-based violence, among other issues of development policy. 
To this list may be added the Ghana Bar Association, which would consider itself to be a ‘professional association’ 
rather than a CSO in the conventional sense. More CSOs engage with security than with justice issues. The focus 
tends to be almost exclusively on the formal sector, but even here, the approach has been selective and 
piecemeal, with attention to police and (to a lesser degree) military issues, but not to intelligence, corrections or 
the prosecutorial system. CSOs lack meaningful engagement with the informal and customary security and justice 
sector.  
 
An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between organisations working within and across the 
security and justice fields   
There is little crossover or joined-up work, though some occurs within the framework of police accountability, 
human rights and, to a lesser extent, gender. Coordination is weak, contributing to an impression of 
fragmentation, competition and working in silos. Evidence of low interest in and little collaboration by CSOs 
around security and justice issues is clear: for instance, CSO participation in the Parliamentary Oversight and SSGM 
courses tends to be low. Hence, ASDR (which runs both programmes) enjoys close relations with the defence and 
national security apparatus and the parliamentary defence and interior committee, but does not appear to have 
had much success in bringing other CSOs on board. CHRI has done notable work on police accountability, but 
remains the only organisation engaged in this area. WIPSEN remains alone in pursuing work on gender and 
security (even though a gender focus is common among CSOs). Similarly, sustained collaboration with public 
oversight institutions such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) tends to be 
low. Nevertheless, CSOs have demonstrated an ability to coordinate on particularly controversial issues, such as 
water privatisation and the Freedom to Information bill. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
In addition to the constraints cited earlier, a number of more specific challenges and opportunities confront the 
small number of organisations working in the security and justice arena. On the one hand, the generally receptive 
(or at least permissive) environment referred to earlier would appear to offer CSOs the opportunity for greater 
engagement with the security and justice sector. Arguably, the security institutions, long isolated from civil life and 
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facing rapid changes that are curbing their political influence and social privileges, are looking to make friends and 
influence people, thus offering opportunities for CSOs to act as interlocutors.    
 
There are several reasons, however, why CSOs in Ghana nevertheless tend to shy away from engaging in security 
and justice issues. Firstly, the perception still persists that security is a ‘hands-off’ area, and justice sector 
institutions are largely seen as remote, foreign, elitist, and unresponsive. In addition, the lack of national security, 
defence and public safety policy frameworks makes it difficult to engage with security issues in an informed and 
meaningful way and hinders transparency. There is no formal SSR – although incremental improvements have 
refurbished the public image of security institutions and led to marginal improvements in effectiveness (at least in 
the capital city). However, fundamental challenges facing the sector such as lack of policy direction, under-funding, 
logistics, and accountability deficits have not been addressed. 
 
Work in this area is further complicated by a lack of expertise in security and justice issues, and the lack of research 
and an evidence base to inform public discussion and policy choices. Furthermore, given the politicisation that 
affects much to do with security and justice, maintaining a sense of independence and non-partisanship – not to 
mention surviving across regimes – becomes a difficult and delicate task. 
 
Indication of the major CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: Legal Resources Centre; Women in Peace 
and Security Network (WIPSEN); African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR); Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative; Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA); Centre for Human Rights Advocacy; Centre for Public 
Interest Law; Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (G-CDD). 
 
8.2 Nigeria 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Nigeria provides many examples of robust CSO work but is also the most problematic operational environment in 
West Africa. It faces a long list of security and justice challenges, conveying an impression of a society facing 
profound crises of both governability and citizenship. These include: blatant electoral fraud; proliferation of 
political, criminal, religious, communal and resource conflicts; poor detection of early warning signals and poor 
conflict management; lack of effective and accountable policing, security services characterised by brutality and a 
sense of impunity (including extrajudicial killings); and limited parliamentary oversight in spite of a dense network 
of parliamentary defence, policing, and intelligence committees (with large staffs, by African standards) that were 
mandated by the 1999 constitution.   
 
If anything, perceptions of the justice sector are even more damning. They involve: poor access to justice; an 
insufficient number of judges; technological backwardness of the court system (only some courts in Abuja have 
modern facilities); and poorly educated, unprofessional court support staff. In addition, there are: trial delays and 
court congestion; a high remand population (and, all too often, virtually indefinite pre-trail remand); prison 
overcrowding; and lack of adequate oversight of prisons, police cells and other detention facilities. The 
overwhelming perception is that the return to electoral democracy has not resolved any of the 
endemic/underlying threats to security and justice in Nigeria (probably the contrary). 
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
The modus operandi of Nigerian CSOs in many respects replicates those of their Ghanaian counterparts. Thus, the 
research found that CSOs operating in the security and justice field tended to be a relatively select minority.  
However, there are also several differences. Nigeria has:   
 A tradition of security/strategic studies and analysis that is better developed in institutional circles beyond 
CSO action. The Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA), National Defence Colleges, universities and 
think tanks reflect Nigeria’s pretensions as a regional power and the more institutionalised influence of the 
military and the ‘militocracy’; 
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 A tradition of both legal and political activism in the face of military authoritarianism, with a pantheon of 
legendary lawyers, which has tended to spill over into SSR advocacy (though in a very general way, lacking 
specific proposals and sustained engagement with the issue); 
 Arguably more developed disciplinary expertise (e.g. CLEEN was cited by Ghanaian colleagues as a model in 
the area of police reform); 
 As the host country of ECOWAS, Nigeria has become a base for regional networking (WACSOF, WANSED, 
CDD, etc.), although the focus again is on regional security and peacebuilding rather than justice.  
 
An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across 
the security and justice fields 
CSOs are narrowly focused on either security or justice. The few examples of joined-up work again occur in the 
areas of police accountability/reform and human rights,  and primarily target the formal security and justice sector 
(though here too in a piecemeal fashion). Thus, there is little coordination within or between security and justice 
organisations and actors.   
 
While this lack of coordination may be attributed to competition for resources and the narrow agendas that drive 
most CSOs, particular reasons for the failure to link security and justice work may be grounded in the fact that the 
national security and justice sectors are two separate (and often antagonistic) communities. They have divergent 
institutional cultures frequently operating in silos (outside the police-prosecution arena), and the fragmentation of 
CSO activity tends to reflect this institutional cleavage. Though true of all three countries, this is nowhere more 
clearly demonstrated than in Nigeria. While there is still a lack of coherence between the formal and informal 
justice systems (attributed to attitudinal resistance to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
arbitration), the 2010 completion review of DFID’s Security, Justice and Growth programme showed encouraging 
signs of improvement. In Lagos ADR is picking up speed, primarily driven by businesses. In Northern Nigeria, ADR is 
mainly being used for family matters. There are also emerging signs of better collaboration between the Sharia 
court system and the formal system.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing CSOs and networks 
Dysfunctions of the state sector (particularly in security and justice) are seen to be providing endless opportunities 
for work and thus are giving CSOs a perverse investment in the current situation. Further, CSOs are sometimes 
perceived as taking a formalistic approach to their work (in part to justify funding), regardless of whether or not it 
makes a real difference on the ground. 
 
Nevertheless, it is felt that there is greater openness and cooperation between the state and CSOs on justice-
related issues than on security-related issues, though some CSOs have worked successfully if unevenly with 
security institutions (e.g. CLEEN’s work with the police). On the other hand, the lack of engagement with security 
institutions has also been attributed to the loss of CSO activism with the dismantling of the military dictatorship in 
1999, since military intervention in politics provided the main motivation for their engagement.  
 
The challenges confronting CSOs are broadly similar to those in Ghana, but additional factors cited were the high 
transaction costs associated with an underdeveloped infrastructure, corruption and bureaucracy. This is also 
growing competition between traditional CSOs and international consulting companies. However, Nigerian CSOs 
are facing an even steeper curve than those in Ghana, operating in an environment riven by conflict, a political 
leadership that is factionalised, corrupt, and felt to be lacking broad public legitimacy, and a political landscape 
dominated by freewheeling political parties. 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly  
There is a huge range of CSOs in Nigeria that undoubtedly merit consideration. Depending on priorities, DFID and 
other donors could feasibly work with the following, which were identified in the first phase of this study: Access 
to Justice; Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN Foundation); Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action 
(PRAWA); BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights; Initiative for Strategic Development (ISD); Community Policing 
Partners; Constitutional Rights Project (CRP); African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG). 
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8.3 Sierra Leone 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
The political environment in Sierra Leone for security and justice CSOs is positive and there has been a discernable 
improvement in the overall security situation. However, environmental factors that undermine human security 
include corruption, organised crime, state-corporate crimes, money laundering, smuggling, human trafficking, and 
weak regulatory and government policies. Further problems include limited access to justice, overloading of the 
court and prosecutorial system (forcing the majority of the population into dependence on the customary and 
informal justice systems), youth unemployment, low salaries and poor conditions of service in both the security 
and justice sectors.  
 
While many successes have been realised as a result of security and justice initiatives in Sierra Leone (in particular, 
an effective, decentralised national security architecture that has allowed largely peaceful elections and change of 
government), several ‘deficits’ remain: 
 Governance of security remains an issue, with weak parliamentary oversight and a concentration of power in 
the Office of the President and (operationally) in the Office of National Security (ONS); 
 In spite of welcome recent donor funding for security and justice programmes – including the ‘Access to 
Justice’ programmes of DFID and the UNDP, the ‘Justice for the Poor’ initiative of the World Bank, the OSIWA-
supported ‘Timap for Justice’, and GTZ’s ‘Promoting the rule of law and justice in West Africa’, the sector 
remains under-supported. A lack of access to formal justice remains very much an issue, with an estimated 87 
per cent of the population depending on customary and informal justice institutions that remain largely 
unregulated. Donor funding has tended, correspondingly, to reflect a bifurcated (‘two-tier’) approach, focusing 
on supporting either the formal or informal and ‘customary’ justice sectors (and sometimes both), but with 
little real understanding of how the two sectors interface (if at all), or, how customary justice institutions 
actually operate, and with what short-and long-term impacts; 
 Corruption in the security and justice sector (and particularly in the police) remains an issue; 
 Sierra Leone is still one of the poorest countries in this region and the world, with high youth unemployment 
and exclusion.  
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
Sierra Leone differs from Ghana and Nigeria in several ways, one of these being that CSOs tend to focus on ‘justice’ 
rather than ‘security’. While a number of organisations (Timap for Justice, Access to Justice Law Centre, Lawyers 
Centre for Legal Assistance, etc.) are involved in cutting-edge work in the justice arena at community level (and in 
rural communities in particular) offering legal aid and paralegal services, relatively few (among them Conciliation 
Resources and the Centre for Development and Security Analysis) engage with SSR on a professional and sustained 
basis (via policy engagement, research and analysis, training and capacity-building). In the area of SSR, the 
government and the ONS (with the liberal support of donors and external actors) have tended to exercise firm 
strategic leadership. 
 
While a number of these CSOs are viewed as well-established, vibrant and commanding experience and expertise, 
nevertheless a range of challenges and capacity issues were seen to confront the sector (see below). 
 
An assessment of the linkages and coordination, if any, between organisations working within and across the 
security and justice fields   
Coordination is viewed as less of a pressing issue than in either Ghana or Nigeria. Indeed, some joined-up security 
and justice work exists among organisations such as Conciliation Resources, Partners in Conflict Transformation 
(PICOT), and the National Movement for Development and Justice. Similarly, there are examples of vibrant 
networking (such as the Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement (BPRM) and the Kailahua District Civil Society 
Organisations (KAIDCSO)). However, such networks appear to operate primarily on local, district, and provincial 
levels, and are often based on personality rather than effective systems, with national networking appearing more 
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tenuous. Networking also seems to be less prevalent in the urban centres of the Western Area, which have both a 
higher proliferation of CSOs and a tendency to more fragmented forms of activity. The lack of a comprehensive 
security and justice sector policy has also proved an obstacle to integrated work, even though, in practice, the 
acute and overlapping nature of issues of poverty, insecurity and justice (in particular limited access to the law in 
dealing with the many human rights abuses which were a legacy of the civil war) have made it unrealistic to 
separate these zones of activity to the extent evident in either Ghana or Nigeria. Fortunately, this policy 
environment is changing; the justice sector now actively engages in the national security architecture via the 
National Security Council Coordination Group, and there are discussions regarding the merger of the security and 
justice strategies. These changes are welcome, of course; nevertheless, the perception persists that while channels 
may exist (or are opening up) for networking, these are not always effectively exploited, perhaps due in part to 
capacity constraints. While issues of capacity need to be addressed at multiple levels, one cannot overstate the 
contribution that an active and well-functioning national SSR network could make to such an endeavour. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
CSO engagement with SSR in Sierra Leone has been slow and limited, and relations between the security sector 
and civil society are still limited. There are several reasons for this: firstly, Sierra Leone emerged from the civil war 
with a legacy of bitterness and division between civil society (particularly women and the youth) on the one hand 
and the security sector on the other, with attendant (and almost universal) initial scepticism toward SSR. Secondly, 
deep suspicions inherited from the civil war (in particular very negative national self-perception and erosion of 
self-confidence) inhibited community action and willingness to engage with national processes. Another 
consideration is that participation by civil society in the peace negotiations in both Abidjan and Lome was 
marginal; and lack of specification of the expected role of civil society in the early stages of SSR, combined with 
severe lack of capacity on the part of both government and CSOs also inhibited engagement. Finally, the strong UK 
bilateral lead, the high-profile involvement of the international community (in particular the UN and IMATT), and 
the large number of international NGOs that flooded Sierra Leone, though welcomed positively by the majority of 
Sierra Leoneans, initially eroded possibilities for national ownership.  
 
However, this environment has substantially improved over time. Sierra Leone is the only one of the three West 
African countries that has attempted systematic security and justice reform, and has a formal policy and strategy 
framework in place that actually assigns roles to CSOs. In particular, the Security Sector Review of 2005 afforded an 
opportunity for CSO participation and networking. A good example of this was the Strengthening Citizen Security 
initiative launched by Conciliation Resources to coordinate CSO participation in the Review. Furthermore, the new 
security paradigm sought to build CSOs into the security architecture, particularly in terms of recognising their 
contribution to border security, intelligence, early warning, and conflict management and reconciliation. CSOs 
were subsequently granted limited representation on the District Security Committees (DISECs) and the Provisional 
Security Committees (PROSECs) as well as the Local Policing Partnership Boards (in the justice sector, there is the 
‘Civil Society Justice Sector Coordinating Group’ (CSJSCG) which is a member of the Justice Sector Task Force). 
While the ONS has officially encouraged this partnership, capacity issues have also limited the extent to which 
these openings can be exploited by CSOs. 
 
On the one hand, the lack of a comprehensive policy embracing the two sectors has tended to inhibit (though not 
entirely prevent) coordinated action across security and justice. Furthermore, within each of these there has been 
a lack of a sector-wide approach. While the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) adopted in 2005 
addressed the need for a holistic, sector-wide approach (encompassing both state and non-state justice sectors), it 
still resisted efforts to integrate the two sectors. However, this policy context is changing, with agreement by both 
the ONS and the Justice Sector Coordination Office for integrated security and justice programming.  
 
There are potentially endless opportunities for CSO work relating to various dimensions of post-conflict 
reconstruction, including security sector reform, parliamentary strengthening, justice sector reform, and peace and 
reconciliation. The forthcoming update of the Security Sector Review by the ONS represents a substantial 
opportunity once again for civil society to engage with and evaluate SSR and progress made thus far. 
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On the other hand, there are numerous challenges: 
 Donor support has led to a 'two-tier' system of programmes focused on: (a) enhancing state capacity (a 
prodigious task in itself); and (b) direct service delivery that by-passes the state and has generally excluded 
capacity-building and policy-influencing. Dialogue is needed on how state and non-state actors supplying 
security and justice services can interact with each other; 
 There is a lack of overall capacity, particularly in the provinces and outside the capital. The ability of CSOs to 
engage in policy discussions is also limited, as is their ability to base their policy debates on a detailed 
evidence base from the grassroots; 
 Reliable, adequate institutional funding and support is lacking, leading to difficulty in funding staff salaries and 
retaining professional staff and in sustaining programmes; 
 There is a lack of training and capacity building for staff and interns, and of academic and research material 
and facilities; 
 There is a lack of coordination mechanisms for civil society engagement with the government, and a perceived 
absence of political will and governmental encouragement and support; 
 There is an over-dependence on external support.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly  
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: Centre for Development and Security 
Analysis; Conciliation Resources; Timap for Justice; Access to Justice Law Centre; Lawyers Centre for Legal 
Assistance (LAWCLA); National Movement for Justice and Development; Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement 
(BPRM); AdvocAid; Advocacy for Reform of Laws Discriminatory against Women in Sierra Leone. 
 
8.4 Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern capacity in West 
Africa 
 
For those organisations and networks operating at the regional level, ECOWAS is seen as offering a receptive 
environment for CSO work (actually in some respects ahead of the individual states), involving some of the 
prominent networks in the sub-region (WACSOF, WANSED, ASSN, WANEP). However, with the exception of 
WANEP (and its more diffuse mandate), these sub-regional networks focus on security and peacebuilding to the 
exclusion of systematic work in the justice arena. The proposed Mano River Security and Justice Network 
(encompassing Guinea-Bissau as well as the four MRU members of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire) 
may well mark a departure.  
 
Donors should have little difficulty identifying organisations to support or work with directly in Sierra Leone, which 
arguably has a more congenial environment for linking security and justice work on the ground. While urban-rural 
cleavages do exist as in Ghana and Nigeria, (in part manifest through differences in capacity); significant 
networking does appear to exist among rural CSOs, with many already working (crucially) to bridge the gap 
between the formal and customary legal regimes. 
 
The new DFID Security and Justice programme could increase focus on demand-side security and justice service 
delivery. DFID could feasibly support, promote or provide: 
 Networking and common consultative fora where security and justice organisations could work together or 
review the mutual impact of their work. Organisations working on parliamentary capacity-building would 
benefit from opportunities to join up the work of the security and judicial committees, as a first step in 
providing the necessary institutional and legal synergies; 
 Enhanced gender presence in CSO security and justice work at all levels, as well as in Parliament and related 
bodies; 
 South-south sharing of experiences and lessons learned; 
 Funding that encourages and rewards joined-up work; 
 Joint funding of security and justice organisations; 
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 Internships designed to expose young professionals to both security and justice environments and create 
awareness of the integrated nature of issues affecting the two environments; 
 Funding for institutional development that specifically addresses capacity to promote joined-up work and 
overarching security and justice competencies; 
 Small grants schemes to encourage joint research and advocacy; 
 Seed funding for new organisations, particularly those interested in working in the rural and customary and 
informal sectors. 
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9. SOUTH ASIA 
By Mallika Joseph 
 
Countries in South Asia fall under two categories – those that are evolving from a conflict situation to a post-
conflict one, and those that are plagued by internal conflict. The post-conflict states are small and characterised by 
high-levels of international presence and assistance. Due to increased international interaction and donor 
priorities, there is a greater understanding of the security and justice sectors and the reforms required therein. The 
reform agenda is top-down, and the countries that fit into this frame of analysis are Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka. (In this report, however, attention has been given only to Afghanistan and Nepal as DFID priority countries). 
CSOs are strong in these countries, but civil society per se is weak.  
 
The second set of countries includes Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Each of these has a plethora of internal 
problems, with the largest growing populations, and a range of ongoing reforms. There is a general lack of 
knowledge on security and justice, except for a handful of individuals and organisations who form the strategic 
community (those working for think tanks or engaged in policy analysis). As a result few organisations work 
primarily in the security and justice sector, and even fewer on security or justice reforms, therefore the push from 
the bottom up is having little effect.  
 
The bulk of CSOs in South Asia work on governance and democratic oversight, human rights, conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding, civil society inclusion and participation, and the rule of law. According to research conducted 
during the first phase of this mapping study, there are over 18 CSOs in the region working primarily on these 
issues. Conversely, fewer than five CSOs work primarily on important sub-sectoral issues such as DDR, border 
security, intelligence reform, media, refugees, private security and penal reform. However, a number of CSOs 
working on development and foreign policy also have a secondary focus on such sub-sectoral issues. These CSOs 
include the regional Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) and the Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust 
(BLAST). 
 
9.1 Afghanistan 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Despite increased foreign troop presence in Afghanistan post 9/11, and the removal of the Taliban from the seat of 
power, the conflict in Afghanistan is far from over. The security systems are being rebuilt and challenges remain in 
marrying a traditional system with a Westphalian model. Of the array of security sector interventions currently 
underway, the sector needing most attention is the police. There is a high level of dissatisfaction among the people 
with regard to the police – in contrast to the Afghan army, which appears to be well trained and well equipped. 
The Afghan National Police is considered by the public to be ill equipped, lacking in training, psychological profiling, 
investigative capabilities, and not people-friendly. 
 
The judicial sector and prisons are also of high concern. The judicial sector exhibits low accountability and is 
marked by a lack of transparency; the court system is very weak, particularly in the Southern and Western regions 
of the country which are home to the Pashtun community. Most justice is meted out through the informal and 
traditional justice systems. Weak courts, ill trained judges and a high level of corruption has resulted in low faith in 
the governmental judicial apparatus, as a result of which the majority of the population prefer to approach the 
traditional justice system. The popular perception is that, instead of dismantling these traditional systems, efforts 
need to be made to mainstream them. Through mainstreaming, these informal systems can be exposed to reform, 
thereby providing them with better enforcing mechanisms, introducing gender parity or more transparency. 
Prisons require a lot of attention, particularly given the fact that many prisoners are held beyond their term of 
sentence. Prisons provide a breeding ground for radicalisation and indoctrination.  
 
Very few CSOs work in the security and justice sectors. Of these, however, indigenous CSOs have great reach and 
access to the population as well as to the government. CSOs with predominantly foreign staff and support have 
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contributed towards increasing the standards of research and service delivery in the country. The Afghan state is 
not particularly encouraging towards CSOs operating in justice and security sectors and in some instances can even 
be hostile, especially in cases where the role of state security and intelligence comes under scrutiny. Nevertheless, 
a few CSOs have managed to build public opinion on issues of human rights and gender issues. Civil society itself is 
still unorganised and ill developed, hence its reach and effectiveness are somewhat constrained.  
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
The CSOs sector can be described as healthy. A primary reason for this is the nature of the conflict and subsequent 
intervention which has opened up space for CSOs. One cannot, however, predict the future trajectory of this 
space, as a vocal and informed civil society is not yet engrained within Afghan society; the state, polity and society 
are equally weak and still evolving. However, within the available space, the current status of CSOs is healthy and 
vibrant. For example, a survey/study undertaken by the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in 2006 in Kandahar 
recommended the creation of a common platform for increased interaction between the people and the 
government on issues of security provision. This recommendation eventually evolved into the Afghan Social 
Outreach Program, launched in 2007. The credibility enjoyed by the CSOs among major stakeholders points to the 
credibility they enjoy among the people, external donors and the government.  
 
The majority of the CSOs operating in Afghanistan are foreign. Of the CSOs working on the security and justice 
sectors, either primarily or secondarily, most work towards civil society inclusion and participation, and human 
rights.  
 
There is some funding available from the Bureau of Population and Refugee Migration for refugees and IDPs, and 
from DFID specifically for IDPs in Helmand. The EC is encouraging CSOs to address gender and minority issues. 
Little funding is available for security and justice sector reform in its broader sense, and generally CSOs are not 
forthcoming in addressing security and justice issues, due to their highly politicised nature. 
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
There is no clear distinction between organisations that work exclusively on security or justice. But there is 
generally more engagement with the security sector and its systems, and much less on issues relating to the justice 
sector. For example, there are no CSOs that work on penal reforms, though there are CSOs which in addition to 
their regular mandate work on transitional justice, rule of law and legal protection of refugees and IDPs. Little 
cooperation, linkages or coordination is apparent between the various CSOs working on security and justice, and 
while the atmosphere can be described as competitive, it is not acrimonious.  
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
No mechanisms exist to bring CSOs together on a common platform or to facilitate communication. Given the lack 
of coordinating mechanisms, efforts in the security and justice sector are scattered, often leading to duplication 
and thereby limiting the effectiveness of interventions. Joint projects and networks may help to build cooperation 
between CSOs. However, these cooperative measures can best be formalised between partners and competitors 
who are equal. Herein lies the biggest challenge, as the size, capacity and reach of CSOs varies.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Funding is, and will continue to be, a principal challenge for many CSOs. Funding is scarce when it comes to 
building local knowledge and capacity. Some organisations have worked on concept notes that need to be 
developed into projects, which eventually could result in recommendations for better local governance and 
administration. Therefore seed money for solid research is a requirement. 
 
If funding becomes available, it may be advantageous to involve a local Afghan CSO in partnership with an 
international CSO based in Afghanistan, since many local CSOs do not have the capacity to use funding effectively 
and transparently. There is a need for support towards: (i) studies relating to the mapping of security agencies at 
the provincial level so as to identify citizens’ security concerns; and, (ii) training and capacity building across all 
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sectors. It was also noted that while funds are unavailable for local governance, money is being spent on helping 
foreigners understand why local governance in Afghanistan is problematic. 
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
Building capacity in the CSOs, particularly those that have the reach, is fundamental to improving their 
contribution towards strategic decision making. Institutional grants would be a good investment. Interventions in 
the security and justice sectors are highly political processes that need to be locally owned; it is therefore 
important that the indigenous CSOs determine and prioritise the issues for intervention. Planning is required to 
create a coordinating mechanism that will facilitate communication between the CSOs that are operating on 
similar issues. Three issues that require attention are the Afghan National Police, the judicial sector and prisons. 
Therefore, it would be worthwhile to invest resources in building the capacity of CSOs to address these three 
critical sub-sectors.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
The Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies is a local organisation with credibility and reach among civil society as 
well as in the government, and could be supported by DFID and other donors to carry out some of the identified 
activities in Afghanistan.   
 
9.2 Bangladesh  
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Even though there are no major conflicts in Bangladesh, the state of internal security in country is not very 
reassuring for its people. The Awami League government, since coming to power in December 2008, has begun to 
address and take the necessary steps to improve the state of public policy in Bangladesh. However, in recent times 
the Government of Bangladesh has systematically worked towards weakening key governance and oversight 
institutions including the anti-corruption commission, human rights commission and election commission. Priority 
issues the government says it will address include rampant corruption in most of the public institutions, political 
patronage and nepotism, lack of bureaucratic transparency and accountability, and the inefficient and corrupt 
nature of the state police forces.  
 
The most prevalent and common security and justice issues that CSOs work on are counter-terrorism (broadly 
defined), civil society inclusion/participation, civil-military relationships, and small arms and light weapons. Other 
crucial issues include legal protection of refuges and IDPs and defence reforms. It is evident that since counter-
terrorism in Bangladesh is defined so as to include the corruption of justice and security institutions, it cannot be 
pursued until these institutions are strengthened. This once again highlights the issue of corruption and the 
challenges involved in strengthening democratic institutions. With regard to the justice sector, the bulk of CSOs in 
Bangladesh work on human rights, rule of law, and access to justice. The well established CSOs in the country in 
terms of research quality, capacity and influence are those that are supported by the government.  
 
Civil society has a minimal role in shaping the state security and justice apparatus and there are no institutional 
mechanisms to bring these two actors together. Furthermore, the functioning of the police and law enforcement 
agencies, which are highly politicised, and intelligence agencies, which operate outside the purview of democratic 
oversight, have further distanced society from state security and justice mechanisms. The Home Ministry has 
initiated a few measures to make some institutions more accountable. However, despite democratic leadership, 
there is little accountability and transparency in their decision making and operations, which frequently leads to 
them being used for political interests. Most often, the security sector, particularly the police, is seen as an 
instrument of regime stabilisation rather than a means of providing security for the people. In this context, CSOs 
are attempting to bridge the gap between society and security actors by providing platforms for the exchange of 
views. The media, in particular, has been very active during and after the caretaker government period in raising 
awareness with regard to the security sector, particularly its level of corruption. Bangladeshi society is relatively 
well informed and has an appetite for information, especially on issues relating to national governance and 
security. Recent studies suggest that the most viewed programme on Bangladesh television is the news. 
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Consequently, the positive role played by the media in raising people’s awareness is critical, although there are 
concerns about political bias. 
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
The general health of CSOs can be described as eager and enthusiastic, with the present government not directly 
opposing their functioning. The structures of state, polity and society are well developed; however, they are not 
aligned so as to enable society as a whole to positively influence state policy. Small steps are being made, but 
much more remains to be achieved. For instance, the current counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the 
government is a good example of a public policy document that has its origins in civil society, having been 
facilitated by a CSO.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
Despite the crucial role the CSOs are capable of playing, the level of collaboration between the CSOs is minimal. 
There are not enough organisations willing to collaborate and there is limited infrastructural support for those who 
are. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Three significant challenges became apparent during interviews with CSOs in Bangladesh. First, with respect to 
funding, insufficient resources were available to promote quality research or facilitate an advisory committee or 
mobilise communities and security agencies together at a regional level. Most CSOs are non-profit entities and 
therefore funding is a big challenge. Significant CSO projects relating to the security sector have been initiated by 
the government, based on a needs assessment undertaken by the government. The second biggest challenge is 
that of human resources: the pool of expertise for security and justice sector issues is very small in Bangladesh. 
And third, the highly centralised nature of government offers little space for local governance bodies to play any 
substantive role in security and justice issues. 
 
During the next five years, democratic control of intelligence and its accountability and transparency will be one of 
the most crucial issues. Although it is part of the current security discourse, it will emerge as an independent 
agenda in the future. Another emerging issue of concern is likely to be migration – regional, internal and 
environmental. Penal reforms will be another issue to contend with in the near future.   
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
There is a need to deepen and widen the knowledge base that exists within the strategic community. There is also 
a need to enlarge the size and capacity of the strategic community to address all security and justice sector issues. 
Bangladesh has a relatively strong civil society, which if exposed to security and justice reform principles could 
become a key stakeholder in the reform process. Secondly, there is a heavy reliance by the main security and 
justice NGOs on government resources whilst others are more reliant on donors. If funds do become available for 
broad security and justice capacity building and knowledge growth, CSOs could significantly enrich the security and 
justice sector debate in the country.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), and the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies 
(BIISS), are two of the oldest think tanks in the country which have proven records of delivery and programme 
management, along with high level of traction within the government and civil society. The Bangladesh Institute of 
Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), a recent entrant into the list of organisations that work on security issues, is 
also worth considering partnering with for SSR initiatives in Bangladesh. Other organisations that DFID and other 
donors could support are Ain O Saillish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), and 
Madaripur Legal Aid. 
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9.3 India 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
India faces significant external and internal security challenges. Externally, India is in a hostile neighbourhood with 
a long-standing dispute with Pakistan. The spread of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan directly affects the 
security situation in India. It is only very recently, since the election of the Awami League in Bangladesh, that 
relations between India and Bangladesh have begun to improve. India’s future relations with Sri Lanka depend on 
how the government in Sri Lanka will deal with the Sri Lankan Tamils and whether they are integrated socially and 
politically into the mainstream. An additional concern is the growing Chinese influence in South Asia, which will 
influence New Delhi’s foreign policy in the region. Internally, India is facing security challenges at different levels. 
Prominent among them is the threat of terrorism from non-state actors who are externally funded. This is no 
longer restricted to the state of Jammu and Kashmir; the 26/11 Mumbai attacks exposed the magnitude of the 
threat from externally funded terrorist groups. Another rapidly emerging security threat is the violence 
perpetrated by leftist extremist groups under the banner of Maoism. Insurgency and violence in other parts of the 
country are largely contained, but corruption and lack of governance have the potential to accentuate these 
security concerns.  
 
Human security continues to be a challenge, with key issues being: the prominence of violence against women, 
legal protection to refugees and IDPs, lack of police and prison reforms, lack of legal aid to the poor, gender issues 
related to security and justice, corruption of justice and security institutions, lack of community safety, and a lack 
of access to justice.  
 
Judicial reform is a crucial area of concern: the lack of access to justice is one of the main concerns for the public in 
both urban and rural areas. A significant percentage of the population is of the view that justice is meted out only 
after a heavy investment of time and money, and this deters the average Indian from filing cases
3
. This is also one 
of the main reasons for the general lack of public faith in the judicial process.  
 
CSOs in India work on an array of security and justice issues, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, including access to 
justice, violence against women, small arms and light weapons, peacekeeping, human rights, governance and 
democratic oversight of security and justice, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, counter-
insurgency, media, civil-military liaison, border management, defence reform and judicial reform.  
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
In the last decade there has been an abrupt rise in the number of CSOs working on security and justice issues and 
this is widely considered to be a result of the state’s lethargy in providing basic governance. ‘Equal’ access to 
security and justice is considered to be abysmally low – largely due to the skewed civilian-police ratio and the 
inadequate number of courts.  
 
CSOs require funding for conducting significant awareness-raising programmes. The average Indian is unaware of 
security and justice mechanisms and the provisions available. This is one of main reasons, apart from corruption, 
bureaucratic hurdles and lack of implementation, for the poor performance of many security and justice policies. 
For example, 90 per cent of Indians are not aware of the Right To Information (RTI) Act and the procedures to file 
an RTI, despite large campaigns by media houses and NGOs
4
.  
 
                                                          
3
 Observation based on interviews conducted as part of phase 2 research. See also TII, 2007, ‘TII-CMS India Corruption Study 
2007’, Transparency International India, New Delhi available at http://www.cmsindia.org/highlights.pdf. The study finds that a 
percentage of BPL households who tried to avail police and land records registration services found that procedural delays and 
corruption had increased in the prevailing year. 
4
 See PRIA, 2006, ‘Tracking progress of Right to Information in 12 States’, Society for Participatory Research in Asia. Available 
from http://cic.gov.in/StudyReports/Tracking%20progress%20of%20RTI%20-%20PRIA.pdf 
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CSOs in India have ample legal space to operate. However, for CSOs that work on national security issues (both 
internal and external), access to information is restricted and there is no periodic declassification of security 
information. While the government is not hostile to the establishment of CSOs, it is not directly supportive either, 
and actually rather indifferent towards CSOs on matters of security and justice: CSO reports and studies relating to 
counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and foreign policy are hardly consulted. Of a more fundamental nature are 
the severe visa regulations imposed by the government which prevent a free exchange of scholars. The 
government therefore has mechanisms in place that indirectly control the activities of CSOs, especially those that 
involve international collaboration on the security and justice sectors. Despite these hurdles, CSOs have managed 
to create a debate on most of the issues, although their impact on public policy has been limited. With regard to 
transparency in functioning, annual auditing (mandated by the Societies Act) has ensured fiscal responsibility and 
management.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
There is cooperation as well as competition between CSOs working on security and justice issues. The competition 
is evident especially among CSOs working on security issues because the think tank culture, specialising in security 
and foreign policy issues, is a relatively new phenomenon. A number of think tanks mushroomed after the nuclear 
tests in 1998 and almost all of them are based in New Delhi, thereby limiting the discourse on India’s foreign policy 
issues to a small strategic fraternity in the capital. Likewise, CSOs working on justice issues such as human rights, 
women’s rights education, and child rights are disconnected from each other; a concerted effort in collaborating 
and coordinating would make a huge difference to programme delivery because of the sheer number of NGOs 
working on these issues.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
There are many opportunities available for CSOs. Financial support (predominantly from NGOs and foundations) is 
available as well as human resources and CSOs can, and have been, agents of change. There is also ample media 
support available and this can be used to initiate large-scale awareness programmes. While resources are available 
for conferences and high-level meetings, there is much less available for research.  
 
Over the next five to ten years, there is likely to be increased CSO interest and engagement with regard to security 
and justice issues. A sizable increase in the number of reports, frequency of events and extensive interaction is 
likely. The government is slowly opening up to the expertise that is available within the strategic community. In the 
next few years, hopefully, CSOs will be considered one of the key stakeholders in government policy formulation. 
 
Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
As in other countries in the region, the strategic community in India is small and comprises mainly of former 
military personnel, Foreign Service officials, academics and journalists. There is a need to expand this small group 
of knowledgeable people. Secondly, there are many reforms that are currently underway in India. But there is no 
knowledge about security or justice sector reforms within the strategic community. Capacity building of the 
strategic community should be of high priority if society is to take the lead in calling for a holistic reform agenda. 
There is also a need to mainstream justice sector expertise. Because the reforms will be self-initiated with no 
external funding support, there is limited opportunity for external actors to engage with the government in these 
sectors.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly  
The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Centre for Civil Society 
and the Centre for Land and Warfare Studies can be partnered with to sensitise and build capacity within the 
strategic community with regard to security activities. Organisations working in the justice sector are scattered and 
diffuse but the Centre for Policy Research has a parliamentary research service which could be supported to 
further justice reform objectives. 
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9.4 Nepal  
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
By late 2009, Nepal was continuing to struggle through a fragile peace process that had seen three changes of 
government in the three years since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  Security related debate 
is dominated by two issues; the future of the Maoist army (integration into security forces versus reintegration 
into civilian life) and the deteriorating public security situation. The Maoist army issue is highly divisive but central 
to the peace process, and linked to the peace agreement commitment to ‘democratise’ the Nepal Army (improve 
democratic control and representativeness of the army). The Nepal Army no longer reports to the Royal Palace, 
but control and oversight by the Ministry of Defence and other bodies is extremely weak. There is widespread 
acceptance that a National Security Strategy is desperately required to inform such debates, but short term peace 
process decisions will have to be made in its absence. To tackle the worsening public security situation, the 
government has introduced a Special Security Plan (primarily resulting in an increased number of Armed Police 
Force personnel). Police reform is not being seriously debated, although the imminent national move to federalism 
and need for police service delivery to be restructured accordingly may prove a catalyst for change. Access to state 
justice institutions is likewise problematic, with relatively vibrant and growing informal mechanisms increasingly 
filling the state vacuum.    
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
In Nepal, CSOs have adequate space to engage with the government, political parties and security institutions in 
making the security and justice sector more democratic, inclusive, transparent and accountable. While CSOs have 
been involved in advocacy and awareness programmes on security and justice issues, they have not been 
successful in influencing public opinion on security and justice issues. The bulk of the CSOs surveyed work on civil 
society inclusion, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, governance and democratic oversight, human rights, and 
gender issues. Despite space for CSO functioning, which is unavailable in most other countries in the region, CSOs 
in Nepal lack the capacity and resources to work on critical issues relating to civil-military relations, defence, 
border and police reforms. The health of the CSOs seems similar to that of the state and the polity. However, it 
must be noted that these three structures – state, polity and society, are all weak in Nepal.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Funding is not a constraint in Nepal. Most INGOs have found it beneficial to partner with local CSOs, and while 
Nepali CSOs provide INGOs with local knowledge, INGOs have complemented this knowledge with technical 
analysis and resource sharing. Whilst the general health of CSOs in Nepal is encouraging, their trajectory is 
dependent upon the political situation in Nepal, which at the moment is very uncertain.  
 
The state until recently has been struggling for its sovereignty, the polity is still evolving and society is learning to 
cope with a failed monarchy, corrupt politicians and revolutionary Maoists. The end of the conflict opened up 
space for many international actors to initiate and support SSR debate in Nepal. As a result, there is a general 
awareness of security issues and ongoing SSR discussion. However, awareness has not translated into expert 
knowledge that can help the community or the state to determine its own SSR agenda.  
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
In contrast to knowledge on SSR, the level of understanding and presence of actual justice sector reform 
programmes is low. One of the critical concerns in Nepal today is the drafting of the constitution. If resources were 
available to engage the constituent assembly members, it would be possible to include some of the salient 
features of the security and justice sectors, (particularly democratic control and oversight), in the constitution. 
Resources are also required to augment the capacity of the Ministry of Defence if it is to provide oversight to the 
defence forces.  
 
 
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
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Depending upon priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: The Centre for South Asian Studies, 
the Nepal Institute for Policy Studies and the Nepal Security Sector Network. 
 
9.5 Pakistan  
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Pakistan has witnessed recurrent political upheavals and security threats – both internal and external – which have 
undermined attempts to build strong democratic institutions. This includes a weak security sector and governance 
agencies that are facing their biggest internal and external security challenges since 2007. The loss of state control 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) and the gradual spread of the 
Taliban to other parts of the country have led some to argue that Pakistan is on the verge of becoming a ‘failed’ 
state. As a state that possesses nuclear weapons, the current pressure on Pakistan to protect its borders, its people 
and its nuclear arsenals is unprecedented.  
 
The main security and justice issue in Pakistan is terrorism and the deteriorating law and order situation across the 
nation. The spread of extremism and a record spate of suicide bombings in the last two years have resulted in 
significant civilian causalities and an extremely fragile state of internal security. The spread of extremism, also 
feeds into the critical problem of radicalisation of the youth. Other crucial issues that feed in directly or indirectly 
to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism include inadequate governance and reforms including rule of 
law, police reforms, judicial reform, and corruption of justice and security institutions. The Pakistan Lawyers’ 
Movement initially presented an opportunity for judicial reforms but later became more politicised, like most 
associations which have a political wing.   
 
Access to justice is an area of high concern. While the legal machinery is available, the judicial crisis has retarded 
the justice delivery process to a great extent. With a significant backlog, and new issues such as anti-terrorism 
legislation and missing persons’ cases, the pressure to overhaul the justice system remains significant. The weak 
justice sector has compounded the problem in the NWFP where people rely on a ‘quick’ justice delivery system 
offered by the Taliban, which gives them a strong foothold in the province. This has a direct impact on the 
insurgency in the province as well as on governance and state functioning.  
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
The main providers of security and justice services in Pakistan are the state institutions. CSOs working on security 
and justice sectors are minimal or non-existent. There is a clear demarcation in the sense that the CSOs that work 
on social reform issues stay away from security and justice, which is strictly considered as the domain of the state. 
While there is legal space for the creation and functioning of CSOs, there is minimal political space to work on 
security and justice issues. Subjects such as defence budgeting and accountability, or a critical review of the 
Pakistan army are viewed as better left alone. The state-dominated discourse on security issues does not allow 
CSOs to initiate activities that directly address the weaknesses of the state system. Since security and justice 
reforms pertain to reforming the state apparatus, CSOs face a lack of encouragement from the state, if not 
hostility. On the other hand there seems to be a self-imposed restraint on the part of CSOs to working on these 
issues.  
 
Of the CSOs surveyed, the bulk of them work on governance and democratic oversight, gender, civil society 
inclusion and participation, human rights, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and rule of law. Despite the 
contextual relevance, no CSO was working on corruption, border control, or civil-military relations.  
 
With regards to the level of funding and the ability of the CSOs to use that funding productively, from the 
interviews conducted, it was apparent that the CSOs functioning in Pakistan are mostly donor-driven. The funds 
provided by donors focus on issues that are in vogue i.e. gender and human rights. The general health of CSOs can 
therefore be said to be weak.  
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Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
While some level of cooperation was observed among CSOs, mostly because of the overlap of agendas, intense 
competition exists among them in terms of securing funding. In fact, there is a sense that particular CSOs are 
monopolising the area that they work/focus on.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
Some opportunities are available for raising funds within the country. For example, a few CSOs received funding 
from the Ministry of Defence to conduct specific public surveys. However, the benefits of the surveys could not be 
maximised as most of these ended up being classified. The EU has recently granted the Pakistani government ten 
million Euros to set up a National Authority for Counter-Terrorism. Therefore opportunities for funding in the area 
of security and justice are opening up. The key challenge, however, lies in selling the ‘reform’ to the government 
and creating an atmosphere of internal inspection regarding the existing security and justice apparatus. It is also 
felt that as long as Pakistan is involved in the war on terror, the law enforcement and justice system will pose a 
major security dilemma in the country.  
 
Internal security will be the key focus in the next five to ten years. Violent armed groups, terrorists groups, threats 
posed by non-state actors, cross-border security, and suicide terrorism will be the key security issues in the future. 
Given the current state of internal security, governance reforms are the lowest of priorities in Pakistan and it was 
felt that the next five years is too short a time to predict any success in this regard. Another key challenge is the 
role of the intelligence agencies. Any work on the functioning of the intelligence agencies is a taboo subject and 
therefore few opportunities for engagement in this field exist. 
 
Police reforms that were initiated in 2002 with the aim of depoliticising the service were abandoned later the same 
year in the run up to the Presidential elections. It could be worthwhile to work towards reintroducing or resuming 
the reform process.  
 
Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
Reform activities remain vague because there is very little understanding of local sensitivities. Therefore, there is a 
need for introductory sessions on security sector governance; this could then be built upon by way of investing in 
workshops and seminars on security sector challenges in Pakistan. There is also a need to strengthen and engage 
with existing CSOs and local stakeholders to develop an in-depth understanding of the many problems to be 
addressed.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Organisations that could be engaged in this process are: the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency, the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme, and the 
Center for Research and Security Studies. The Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, located at the Quaid-i-
Azam University, is currently in the process of drawing up the syllabus for a course on security and justice sector 
reform.  
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10. SOUTHEAST ASIA 
By Karla Mae Pabelina 
 
Southeast Asia is largely free from interstate conflicts. The quality of domestic governance varies widely as do the 
political regime types. Ethnic separatism continues to challenge domestic security in Indonesia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines (also still battling communist insurgency), and Thailand. The main security and justice issues that 
prevail in the sub-region are: human rights violations, land disputes, gender issues related to justice and security, 
access to justice and legal aid to the poor. While CSOs and networks focused on security and justice issues have 
proliferated in four older ASEAN member-states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), the political 
environment in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam continues to constrain the growth of these organisations 
and networks. 
  
The DFID priority countries of Cambodia and Vietnam are also different from each other in this regard. While 
relatively independent (from government and party) CSOs in Cambodia have emerged following the country's new 
political openness after the UNTAC-supervised elections in the early 1990s, similar formations in Vietnam have yet 
to emerge. In the latter, the formations outside of formal government and the party remain either initiated and/or 
supervised/controlled/constrained by, or associated with either government or party. They began as women's, 
labour, rural development, or other sectoral groups within the party, or organised and run by the government. 
CSOs as generally understood (as voluntary, independent, non-governmental groups of citizens) are yet to emerge 
in Vietnam. 
 
10.1 Cambodia 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
The main security and justice issues in Cambodia include: human rights violations, land disputes, gender issues 
related to justice and security, access to justice and legal aid for the poor.  
 
The main sectors in which CSOs and networks operate are: human rights, gender issues related to justice and 
security, access to justice, rule of law, legal aid for the poor, legal protection of refugees and IDPs, and conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding.  
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
The UNTAC period (1992-1993) marked the re-emergence of civil society organisations in Cambodia; this can be 
attributed to significant financial input from international donor agencies, the influx of regional and international 
CSOs, and the establishment of a more liberal political atmosphere during this period.  
 
Currently there is no law that provides for a comprehensive and clear legal framework for the operation of CSOs in 
Cambodia. There have been a few draft versions of a NGO bill but it seems that a final version has yet to be 
completed. Nonetheless, CSOs in Cambodia are subject to the laws of the land: they are required to register in 
relevant government offices; CSO staff are subject to income taxes; and they must comply with the audit laws and 
other financial and legal regulations.  
 
Given the relative novelty of civil society in Cambodia (when compared to other ASEAN-5 countries), some 
government members regard them as anti-government and oppositional. This is especially apparent for civil 
society actors promoting good governance, greater democratic values, justice and security. 
 
Coverage amongst CSOs is skewed towards justice issues such as access to justice, legal protection for IDPs and 
refugees, land disputes and domestic violence. This can be attributed to that the fact that justice appears to be a 
priority of international donor agencies. In comparison there are no independent organisations working on core 
security sector issues such as border security, civil-military relations, DDR, Intelligence reform, police reform and 
private security. Such issues remain confined to government-supported organisations and institutions. 
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The financial position of CSOs in Cambodia is generally weak as the majority depend solely on foreign sources of 
funding.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
It can be said that the complex line between “security” and “justice” is blurred in Cambodia, with CSOs working on 
interconnected issues that cover both fields.  
 
For example, the ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies), which includes the 
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), is a regional organisation that operates on issues related to 
security and justice. Another noteworthy network is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
(CSCAP), which has a Cambodian member committee and is subsidised by the Cambodian government. CSCAP 
provide policy recommendations to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and conduct policy studies on hard and soft 
security issues. 
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
For security-orientated organisations like CICP, there is a need to undertake intensive and extensive personnel 
recruitment, training and education for them to better interface with their justice counterparts who tend to be 
more autonomous, visible and proactive. It is also necessary to improve programming to reduce harmful 
competition, particularly in those justice and human rights issues that are more predominant, and to maximise use 
of resources and improve impact on policy. 
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks  
The re-emergence of civil society in Cambodia was tolerated, if not sanctioned, by the government following the 
UNTAC years. CSOs have therefore gained traction and have established links with regional networks which the 
government has had to accommodate. A few have also worked in partnership with government institutions – such 
as CICP, CSCAP Cambodia, Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) and the 
Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR). Nonetheless, civil society and the government in Cambodia are 
equally weak, and both need further assistance from the international community.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly  
Depending upon priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation 
and Peace (CICP); Cambodian Centre for Human Rights; Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of 
Human Rights (LICADHO); The Protection of Juvenile Justice (PJJ); Center for Social Development (CSD); Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP); Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict; and 
Action for Conflict Transformation (ACTION ASIA).  
 
10.2 Vietnam 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
The main security and justice issues in Vietnam include: domestic violence, gender issues related to justice and 
security, access to justice, and legal aid for the poor. There are no ‘real’ CSOs in Vietnam. Formations outside 
formal government structures are initiated and/or supervised, controlled, constrained by or associated with the 
government and party. 
 
There are significantly more organisations working on issues of domestic violence and gender, which are 
considered to less politically sensitive and are significant entry points for work on the rule of law and access to 
justice. Furthermore, non-governmental (or quasi-governmental) actors working on issues such as rule of law and 
access to justice are relatively new.  
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An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
It is only up until recently that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam allowed for limited and controlled space for 
growth of what might be called an independent civil society. This can be attributed to the openness brought about 
by ASEAN membership, rapid economic growth and its social consequences, as well as globalisation in general. 
Previously, any form of organisational expression of collective identity beyond that of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam and Friendship organisations was suppressed. Nevertheless, following doi moi the political and economic 
context of the country has been changing. Since the mid-1990s, the institutional environment has been shifting 
from that of total state control to the recognition of the contributions of other development actors for which 
limited and well-defined space has been allowed. Thus, Vietnam can now be described as being slowly increasingly 
tolerant of autonomous civil activities, but civil society and its activities remain highly contested and politically 
sensitive. 
 
There have been a number of individual decrees issued as basis for the establishment of CSOs in Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, such ad hoc regulations do not provide for a comprehensive and clear legal framework for the 
operation of CSOs in the country. The government is currently trying to draft new laws that will set out a legal 
framework.   
 
CSOs and networks in Vietnam are weak in comparison with their counterparts in other ASEAN-5 countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). This can be attributed to a lack of financial resources, 
capacity and legal framework.  
 
The primary sectoral focus of security and justice is domestic violence. There are no independent organisations 
working on issues of border security, civil-military liaison, defence reform, intelligence reform, penal reform or 
private security. These areas remain firmly in the domain of the state.  
 
All of the CSOs and networks in Vietnam lack financial resources. Many receive support from foreign donors and 
INGOs to implement projects and conduct research. A number also receive varying forms and amounts of 
government subsidy. 
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across the security and 
justice fields 
There are no CSOs (voluntary, independent, non-governmental groups of citizens) or networks in Vietnam working 
on issues of security per se. The few research institutions and think tanks that focus on security and justice operate 
within the framework of the government and are best described as quasi-governmental. They are not 
“independent voices” that provide alternative recommendations for policy-making. It is therefore difficult to 
consider security and justice linkages in the Vietnamese context. 
 
The ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies) is a regional organisation that operates on 
issues related to security and justice. It has a member institution from Vietnam which is The Diplomatic Academy 
of Vietnam (formerly the Institute for International Relations). Another noteworthy network is the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which has a Vietnamese member committee. CSCAP Vietnam is 
one of CSCAP’s most active members, co-chairing one of its most active study groups (on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, and the related issue of Export Controls in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1540), and 
participating actively in the other study groups whose focus is of interest to Vietnam. It is subsidised by the 
government.  
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice?  
It would be beneficial for CSOs to focus on less politically sensitive but economically necessary aspects such as the 
rule of law, human resource development and capacity building. CSOs could also find allies in government that can 
effectively serve as champions of security and justice from within. Independent voices need to avoid strategies and 
tactics that threaten the government’s “comfort zone” – i.e. the general set of conditions where the Vietnamese 
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Government does not feel that their legitimacy or functions are being threatened. This essentially means adopting 
a non-confrontational approach to security and justice advocacy.  
 
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks  
Civil society in Vietnam is still in an embryonic stage. Formations outside the state are initiated, subsidised, 
supervised, controlled, constrained by or associated with the Party. For independent voices to move from the 
margins into the mainstream, they need to continue to engage with the government and donor community on less 
politically sensitive issues like gender violence and the rule of law.  
 
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending upon priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with: Domestic Violence Prevention 
Network in Vietnam (DOVIPNET); Vietnam Lawyers Association (VLA); Centre for Legal Research and Education 
Studies (LERES); Institute for Research and Policy, Law and Development (PLD); Vietnam Union of Friendships 
Organization; Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP); Global Partnership for the Prevention of 
Armed Conflict; and Action for Conflict Transformation (ACTION ASIA).  
 
10.3 Programme suggestions as how to best support Southern security and 
justice CSO capacity in Cambodia and Vietnam 
 
Since both Cambodia and Vietnam share many socio-political features that tend to inhibit security and justice 
activities, the same programme suggestions are relevant to both countries.  
 
It would make sense for DFID to provide technical and financial support for the activities of those academics and 
non–governmental actors who are trusted by the government. Partnership and collaborations could be 
encouraged between and among the identified CSOs and networks. Support could also be given so that CSOs are 
able to engage with the appropriate government agencies.  
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11. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
By Mustapha Adib 
 
Countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are divided into two groups: (1) Iraq and Palestine, where a 
situation of security chaos prevails and where civil society is funded and supported by international donors; and (2) 
a set of very strong, if not entirely authoritarian, states in which security matters are considered not as the 
guarantee of the survival of the country, but as the guarantee of the survival of the regime.  
 
Therefore, all matters related to the security and justice sector are very tightly controlled by the state. Civil-
military cooperation is kept to a minimum, while civilian oversight remains minimal. Needless to say, there is little 
space for civil society organisations to advocate for civil and political freedoms, human rights, penal reform, and 
judicial reform, and for the ceasing of the violations committed by security sector personnel.     
 
11.1 Yemen 
 
A brief overview of security and justice issues 
Yemen faces a number of security and justice challenges as a result of the war, the poorly managed reunification 
(which created huge dissatisfaction in the South) and the tribal structure of the society. The absence of the rule of 
law jeopardises the security of the whole Arabian Peninsula.   
 
There are numerous security challenges presented by the presence of non-state actors such as the “Houthi” 
militias, which are Zaidite Shiite groups and operate in the Sadah governorate. In addition, the “Southern 
Movement” is a loosely organised secessionist movement operating in the South as a response to the perceived 
mishandled unification of the country. Some Southern groups have been privileged by the union, which has 
created further discontent amongst groups who feel that they have been marginalised. Although it has not yet 
accepted this endorsement, the Southern Movement has been officially supported by the leader of “Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP), Nasser Al-Wahayshi. The “Kataeb el Ansar” are tribal militias directly yet 
unofficially supported by the state, and other tribes represent de facto non-statutory forces. Obviously, the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons is closely associated with the profusion of these non-state actors in 
their multiple forms. The presence of extremist and terrorist movements is a particular concern, with Yemen 
becoming the new headquarters of AQAP after counterterrorism measures in Saudi Arabia forced them across the 
border.  
 
Other security concerns include: piracy along the coast; conflicts around water (likely to increase as misused 
resources run out); the cultivation of “qat” (which impairs the production of food, consumes precious water 
resources, and thus exacerbates the risk of future major instability); the use of child soldiers; difficulties in the DDR 
of former combatants (a strong factor being the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities sufficiently enticing to 
convince combatants to leave militias); Somali refugees, Ethiopian migrants, and internally displaced persons; and 
constant violations of human rights by the various statutory, state-supported and non-state actors of the formal 
and informal security sector, including prison personnel.   
 
Basic access to justice for excluded groups is arguably the most significant justice-related challenge. Access to 
justice and safety in Yemen is uneven and inequitable; many citizens have limited access to the formal justice and 
security system. In large parts of the country, the government does not and cannot deliver justice and safety 
services because of limited human resources and capital infrastructure. Where formal services are provided, 
judicial processes are lengthy, often costly and decisions tend to be influenced by social or political bias. Other 
justice challenges centre on violations of human rights, including torture and sexual assaults committed by security 
personnel, prison staff, and state-supported militias who are not brought to trial. In addition, penal courts do not 
respect international norms and standards and the accused are often denied a fair trial. Criticism of the state is not 
well tolerated: the press is censored and threatened into not reporting these violations and the number of political 
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prisoners is significant. Laws largely remain discriminatory to women and the death penalty is still applied, even to 
offences carried out by children.   
 
An assessment of the general health of the CSO security and justice sector 
There are three types of CSOs in Yemen: a medium-sized group of inefficient ones, a small group of around ten 
independent CSOs, and a number of CSOs working with and depending on the state. There are many Yemeni CSOs 
dealing with broader human rights issues, but only a few primarily working in the field of security and justice. In 
fact, only six primary security and justice CSOs were recorded during in the first phase of this study. These CSOs are 
chronically understaffed and funding levels are barely sufficient to produce studies and reports, and certainly not 
sufficient for the provision of services such as legal assistance.  
 
Linkages and coordination, if any, between those organisations working within and across security and justice 
fields 
Coordination between CSOs has always been a problem, partly because of cultural reasons (lack of national unity, 
communitarian trends), and partly because of political ones (the fear of being registered as an “anti-government” 
CSO). There is only one national network (which is supported by Denmark), the Yemeni Network for Human Rights, 
which includes six CSOs.  
 
How can security and justice CSOs best coordinate to deliver improvements in the provision of security and 
justice? 
Mechanisms could be put into place to facilitate dialogue and collaboration amongst CSOs and between NGOs and 
local community groups. For example, collaborative and neutral academic studies on terrorism and arms 
proliferation could help reconcile differing points of view, which would lead to increased linkages between CSOs. 
These studies should not be limited to desk research, but need to involve as many CSOs and local actors as possible 
in order to build consensus and increase linkages.  
  
Opportunities and challenges facing existing CSOs and networks 
The main opportunities for Yemeni security and justice CSOs come from international donor funding. CSOs support 
issues of concern to the population (although most people would not dare to oppose the state individually). In 
addition, many CSOs have been created over the past few years, which is seen by some as a positive sign. 
Challenges include the lack of support from the state – which tends to work only with those CSOs deemed to be 
“pro-state” and not with those which deal with sensitive subjects. The lack of funding available for service 
provision and front-line activities also presents a substantial challenge, as does the lack of expertise within some of 
the smaller CSOs, the lack of planning and the lack of experienced staff. 
 
Although the security situation makes it increasingly necessary to address issues of security and justice, growing 
fragmentation and rising poverty levels mean that it is increasingly difficult to carry out efficient programmes.  
  
Key CSOs and networks that DFID may be able to work with directly 
Depending on priorities, DFID and other donors could feasibly work with the following CSOs, which have sufficient 
staff, experience and expertise: The Human Rights Information and Training Center (HRITC); the Yemeni 
Observatory of Human Rights; the National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD); and 
Partners’ Yemen. 
 
Programme suggestions as to how to best support Southern security and justice CSO capacity 
Support could take several forms:  
 Parliamentary capacity building for members of the National Defence and Security and Justice committees is 
urgently required; 
 Activities aimed at building confidence between government institutions (apart from the Parliament) and 
CSOs – particularly the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior; 
 Several important security and justice issues could be championed by civil society and supported by the 
general population. Support for civil society awareness campaigns is needed in the specific areas of women 
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and children’s rights, civilian (including parliamentary) oversight of the security sector, civil society oversight 
of the security sector, proliferation of SALW, and penal and judicial reform; 
 Funding could be made available for the delivery of services such as legal aid and victim assistance. Funding 
could also be directed towards neutral studies on those issues which prevent the management of the security 
and justice sector by the state according to the principles of good governance, rule of law and democracy. 
Any treatment of the justice sector needs to be handled with care, particularly because of conflicting 
perceptions of justice which arise from different views of the origin of justice (e.g. Shari’a or Civil/Penal 
codes) and of the channels of justice (secular or religious courts). It is noteworthy that some people would be 
content with a mix of the two (e.g. justice derived from Shari’a applied by secular courts); 
 Support for a free press and freedom of expression and reconciliation between governments and 
independent CSOs could be encouraged; 
 Encouragement of links between CSOs and expert professional networks such as the American Bar 
Association.  
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12. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The range of countries included in this mapping study represent diverse socio-political contexts. In addition, each 
country provides a unique set of circumstances in which security and justice organisations operate. Therefore, the 
programming recommendations made throughout this report, both at the country or sub-regional levels are 
context-specific.  
 
The success of donor support for security and justice CSOs often depends to a great extent on the political will of 
governments to enable CSOs to work freely. CSO-government engagement on issues of security and justice is 
inherently difficult in many countries owing to the nature of political regimes (for example, where the state has 
authoritarian tendencies or where military regimes preside). In some cases, the political space for CSOs to engage 
in issues of security and justice is being increasingly suppressed – Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen are prime examples. 
In such situations, donors need to seriously consider the risks of engaging with CSOs on issues of security and 
justice.  
 
Donors who wish to support security and justice CSOs need to take account of the extent to which donor 
interactions with government structures in the field of security may influence the extent and quality of donor 
interaction with CSOs. Support for security and justice CSOs cannot be viewed or undertaken separately from the 
broader foreign and security policy of donor states. Therefore, if security and justice CSOs are to be supported, the 
full array of donor state policies need to be considered. 
 
In many countries, an understanding of security and justice as conceptualised and defined by donors is lacking 
amongst civil society – and an understanding of these issues as conceptualised by civil society is often lacking 
among donors and governments. This is even the case in those countries where civil society as a whole is 
otherwise vibrant. Consequently, donors could consider supporting efforts aimed at increasing the basic level 
understanding on security and justice matters – especially amongst those human rights and peacebuilding CSOs 
who work on the periphery of what are considered as core security and justice issues. In parallel, the strategic 
community (i.e. those working for think tanks or engaged in policy analysis) on security and justice issues needs to 
be broadened – in many cases there are only a few such organisations, and they are not mature. There is also a 
need to encourage and support research capacity and expertise in security and justice – particularly the nurturing 
of new and young researchers. 
 
Although the terms “security” and “justice” are partially overlapping concepts, joined-up approaches to security 
and justice work is rare in almost all contexts. Collaborative fora do not exist in most of the countries studied. 
Recommendations made in almost all sub-regions stated that donor approaches need to consider encouraging 
collaboration at the outset by devising schemes that reward collaboration between CSOs that otherwise work 
separately on issues of security and justice. However, donors also need to understand that in attempting to 
integrate security and justice activities, they may come up against local and national cleavages. 
 
Lastly, without wanting to undermine the findings of this study, there is a need for more detailed assessments at 
national and sub-regional levels of needs, approaches and programming options. These assessments need to take 
account of existing regional and national apparatus and explore how security and justice can be mainstreamed into 
existing policy and provisions. In addition, because so much security and justice programming is currently limited 
to engagement with formal systems, assessments need to consider approaches that involve non-formal and 
customary systems of security and justice. These assessments could be led by CSOs identified in this report and 
could provide a constructive and practical basis for collaboration between security and justice organisations in all 
of the countries studied here.  
 
